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Three Essays on International Migration 
Xiaoning Huang 
 The first chapterr studies how economic, educational, political, geographic, and 
demographic factors are associated with immigrant skill selection in South Africa and the United 
States to test the theories related to immigrant selection in the two different destination countries. 
I use data from South Africa’s 2011 census and the American Community Survey for 2007-
2011. The analytical sample includes immigrants in South Africa and the United States who 
migrated at age 25 or older from Europe, Africa, and Asia from 1990 to 2011. The study found 
that the conventional theories in migrant selection do not hold for international migration 
between developing countries. More extensive Asian Diaspora in South Africa was associated 
with the emigration of more highly educated Asians. Lower GDP per capita in African countries 
was associated with more educated emigration to South Africa. The findings also suggest that for 
developing countries, such as the ones in Africa and Asia, better economic equality and political 
stability might help prevent brain drain.  
Using data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 census and American Community Survey for 
2001 to 2019, the second chapter investigates how working-age Asian immigrants’ educational 
attainment and professional abilities when arriving in the United States have evolved over the 
past four decades. The findings suggest that new Asian immigrants were more positively selected 
on education than non-Asian immigrants and US natives, and this pattern of positive selection 
increased over time. Newly arrived South Asian and East Asian immigrants had the highest share 
of highly educated professionals than Southeast Asians and US-born persons. Using a regression 
discontinuity design within the descriptive framework of this study, I infer that the enactment 
 
 
and changes in the H1-B program might have contributed to the changing patterns of the 
educational and occupational selection among East and South Asian Immigrants. The results also 
shed light on how Asian immigrants’ skill selection might be related to the size of Asian 
diasporas in the US and sending countries’ income, inequality, and education level.   
The third chapter investigates the gap in welfare use between immigrants and natives 
over a 24-year period using the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current 
Population Survey from 1995-2018, spanning periods of economic recessions and recoveries, 
changes in welfare policy regimes, and policies towards immigrants. A novel contribution of our 
research is to adopt the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis to study the effects of 
demographic factors, macroeconomic trends and policy on welfare use gap between immigrants 
and natives. Our analysis leads to three main findings: one, if immigrants had the same 
demographic characteristics as natives their participation in means-tested programs would have 
been much less overall and much below those of natives. This finding holds true across broader 
measures of welfare receipt capturing cash and near cash programs and health insurance as well 
as participation in five specific safety net programs. It also holds true across periods of economic 
recessions and recovery. Second, we find evidence that the business cycle impacts immigrant 
and native welfare participation differently. Immigrant participations in Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families, Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program and State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program are more sensitive to the business cycle than native participations. Three, we 
find that changes in program eligibility explain only a modest proportion of the immigrant-native 
gap in welfare use. A possible explanation for this finding is that changes in eligibility rules have 
affected only specific immigrant populations (e.g., new immigrants) whereas our analysis 





Table of Contents 
 
Figures and Tables ......................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgments.................................................................................................................... xxviii 
Dedication .................................................................................................................................. xxix 
Preface............................................................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 1: Immigrant Skill-Selection: A Case Study of South Africa and the United States ........ 3 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2 Data ....................................................................................................................................... 9 
1.3 Empirical Strategy............................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 Results ................................................................................................................................. 13 
1.5 Conclusion and Discussion ................................................................................................. 19 
Chapter 2: Brain Gain from Asia: Educational and Occupational Selection of Asian Migrants 
into the United States .................................................................................................................... 21 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Data ..................................................................................................................................... 29 
2.3 Empirical Strategy............................................................................................................... 30 
2.4 Results ................................................................................................................................. 32 
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion ................................................................................................. 41 
Chapter 3: What Explains the Gap in Welfare Use among Immigrants ....................................... 45 
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 45 





3.3 Empirical Strategy............................................................................................................... 57 
3.4 Results ................................................................................................................................. 61 
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion ................................................................................................. 69 
Epilogue ........................................................................................................................................ 72 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 75 
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 92 
Appendix B ................................................................................................................................... 94 









Figures and Tables 
Chapter 1 
 
Figure 1. Years of schooling: Migrants moved at age 25 or older in South Africa and the United States from Africa, Asia, and Europe 







Table 1. Mean Values of Key Variables by destination and regions of origin.  
Destinations: South Africa  United States 
Regions of Origin: Europe Asia Africa  Europe Asia Africa 
        
Sample Sizes 2,354 3,136 44,108  64,311 152,832 18,342 
Years of Schooling of The Migrants 12.71 10.98 9.42  14.06 13.27 13.69 
Proportion of Migrants with College Education 0.51 0.27 0.11  0.72 0.66 0.70 
        
Sending Country GDP per capita 33998.32 1117.84 727.84  14667.92 3776.42 1051.12 
Sending Country GINI Index (0 - 1) 0.50 0.44 0.48  0.45 0.44 0.45 
Sending Country Average Years of Schooling 11.47 5.05 5.39  10.24 6.42 4.66 
        
Sending Country Voice and Accountability Index (-2.5 - 2.5) 1.32 -0.41 -0.87  0.53 -0.33 -0.70 
Sending Country Political Stability Index (-2.5 - 2.5) 0.77 -1.27 -0.63  0.23 -0.47 -1.01 
        
Size of Migrant Network in Destination Country 10.56 9.02 11.65  12.13 13.42 10.95 
Distance Between Origin and Destination (1000 km) 4.67 4.36 0.84  8.38 12.66 8.15 
        
Notes: Individual level data are from ACS 2007 - 2011 and South Africa 2011 Census. Sample includes migrants who migrated at age 25 or older between 
1990 and 2011 from African, Asian, or European countries of origin that have over 50 observations in the data. The country level statistics in the table are 







Table 2. Determinants of education for AAE migrants 
Outcomes: Years of Schooling  Having Some College or More Education 
Destinations: South Africa United States  South Africa United States 
          
Log (Size of Migrant Network) 0.00 -0.07 -0.62*** -0.65***  -0.06** -0.06** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.31) (0.29) (0.08) (0.09)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Log (GDP per capita) -0.66*** -0.64*** 0.06 0.06  -0.03** -0.03** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
GINI Index -3.58* -3.17 -0.91 -0.92  0.28 0.27 -0.05 -0.05 
 (2.13) (2.07) (0.89) (0.89)  (0.24) (0.24) (0.11) (0.11) 
          
Voice and Accountability Index 0.01 -0.07 0.11* 0.10  -0.02 -0.02 0.02** 0.02* 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Political Stability Index 0.10 0.09 -0.26*** -0.26***  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Average Years of Schooling  -0.20**  -0.04   0.01  -0.01 
  (0.09)  (0.04)   (0.01)  (0.00) 
          
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around countries of origin and years of origin are shown in parentheses. Data for individual years of schooling are from 
ACS 2007 - 2011 and South Africa 2011 Census. Sample includes migrants who migrated at age 25 or older between 1990 and 2011 from African, Asian, or 
European countries of origin. All models control for age of migration, gender, race, country of origin, and year of arrival (1990 - 2011).  








Table 3. Determinants of years of schooling by regions of origin.  
Destinations: South Africa  United States 
Regions of Origin: Europe Asia Africa  Europe Asia Africa 
        
Log (Size of Migrant Network) -0.49 3.94*** -0.16  -0.99*** -0.90*** -0.62*** 
 (0.39) (0.59) (0.37)  (0.14) (0.17) (0.23) 
        
Log (GDP per capita) 0.56 -0.33 -0.60***  0.03 -0.07 -0.12 
 (0.52) (0.90) (0.13)  (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) 
        
GINI Index -3.86 -0.33 -3.13  -1.12 -0.08 4.33 
 (5.66) (14.39) (2.67)  (1.28) (1.32) (2.63) 
        
Average Years of Schooling 0.01 -1.01* -0.22  -0.05* -0.06 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.60) (0.16)  (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) 
        
Voice and Accountability Index -1.10 -0.99 -0.15  0.27*** 0.28** -0.05 
 (1.00) (0.85) (0.26)  (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) 
        
Political Stability Index -0.18 0.80*** 0.06  0.03 -0.23*** -0.24*** 
 (0.27) (0.30) (0.10)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around countries of origin and years of origin are shown in parentheses. Data for individual years 
of schooling are from ACS 2007 - 2011 and South Africa 2011 Census. Sample includes migrants who migrated at age 25 or older between 
1990 and 2011 from African, Asian, or European countries of origin. All models control for age of migration, gender, race, country of 








Table 4. Determinants of college education by regions of origin.  
Destinations: South Africa  United States 
Regions of Origin: Europe Asia Africa  Europe Asia Africa 
        
Log (Size of Migrant Network) -0.05 0.64*** -0.07**  -0.18*** -0.08*** -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
        
Log (GDP per capita) 0.04 -0.06 -0.04***  -0.00 -0.02* 0.01 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
        
GINI Index -1.39 3.17 -0.54**  0.04 -0.05 0.76** 
 (1.18) (1.91) (0.24)  (0.21) (0.16) (0.31) 
        
Average Years of Schooling 0.01 -0.09 -0.03***  -0.01* -0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Voice and Accountability Index -0.12 -0.02 -0.02  0.03** 0.04*** -0.00 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
        
Political Stability Index -0.07 0.08** -0.00  0.02 -0.02* -0.03** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around countries of origin and years of origin are shown in parentheses. Data for individual years 
of schooling are from ACS 2007 - 2011 and South Africa 2011 Census. Sample includes migrants who migrated at age 25 or older between 
1990 and 2011 from African, Asian, or European countries of origin. All models control for age of migration, gender, race, country of 





Table 5. Moderating effects of migration distance on migrants’ years of schooling.  
Destinations: South Africa  United States 
Regions of Origin: Europe Asia Africa  Europe Asia Africa 
        
Log (Migrant Network) 3.34 19.79*** 0.89**  -0.91 0.61 -1.70** 
 (4.35) (2.98) (0.43)  (0.79) (0.83) (0.78) 
Log (Migrant Network) -0.86 -4.09*** -0.81***  -0.01 -0.14* 0.14 
x Migration Distance (0.97) (0.80) (0.17)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
        
        
Log (GDP per capita) -2.29 12.43*** -0.19  0.56** -0.77* 1.54** 
 (2.78) (2.65) (0.17)  (0.27) (0.40) (0.65) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.67 -2.08*** -0.38***  -0.06** 0.06* -0.20*** 
x Migration Distance (0.65) (0.39) (0.11)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) 
        
        
GINI Index 187.42 264.35*** 7.09  -8.40 1.23 47.29*** 
 (122.40) (49.59) (6.58)  (5.30) (10.40) (16.68) 
GINI Index -43.01 -49.83*** -9.84  0.83 -0.10 -5.06** 
x Migration Distance (27.60) (9.56) (6.27)  (0.55) (0.83) (1.99) 
        
        
Average Years of Schooling 0.31 10.03*** 0.35*  0.09 0.04 -1.04** 
 (1.17) (2.24) (0.18)  (0.12) (0.19) (0.53) 
Average Years of Schooling -0.06 -2.47*** -0.71***  -0.02 -0.01 0.12** 
x Migration Distance (0.24) (0.50) (0.13)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
        
        
Voice and Accountability Index -19.91 -16.01** -0.08  -0.40 0.05 -0.44 
 (12.21) (7.90) (0.29)  (0.55) (0.78) (0.90) 
Voice and Accountability Index 4.10 3.49* -0.08  0.07 0.02 0.05 
x Migration Distance (2.63) (1.85) (0.18)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) 
        
        
Political Stability Index -0.72 0.92 0.27  -0.71* 0.43 -2.72*** 
 (2.09) (4.32) (0.18)  (0.43) (0.42) (0.70) 
Political Stability Index 0.12 -0.03 -0.25  0.09* -0.05 0.31*** 
x Migration Distance (0.46) (1.04) (0.16)  (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) 
        
Notes: Each column in each panel shows the results of one country-level indicator interacting with migration 
distance while controlling for all the other indicators. All models control for age of migration, gender, race, country 
of origin, and year of arrival (1990 - 2011). Migration distances are measured in 1000 km. Robust standard errors 






Table 6. Moderating effects of migration distance on migrants’ college education.  
Destinations: South Africa  United States 
Regions of Origin: Europe Asia Africa  Europe Asia Africa 
        
Log (Migrant Network) -0.91 3.15*** -0.06*  -0.23* -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.90) (0.33) (0.03)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.09) 
Log (Migrant Network) 0.19 -0.65*** -0.01  0.01 -0.00 0.00 
x Migration Distance (0.20) (0.09) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
        
Log (GDP per capita) -1.06* 2.01*** -0.04***  0.07 -0.04 0.22*** 
 (0.60) (0.28) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) 
Log (GDP per capita) 0.26* -0.34*** 0.01  -0.01** 0.00 -0.03** 
x Migration Distance (0.13) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
        
        
GINI Index 21.41 47.47*** 2.62***  -1.15 -3.59*** 3.59* 
 (24.90) (4.58) (0.62)  (0.83) (1.32) (2.12) 
GINI Index -5.13 -8.34*** -3.04***  0.14 0.28*** -0.33 
x Migration Distance (5.59) (0.93) (0.60)  (0.09) (0.11) (0.25) 
        
        
Average Years of Schooling 0.02 1.60*** -0.00  0.01 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.25) (0.22) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Average Years of Schooling -0.00 -0.38*** -0.03**  -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
x Migration Distance (0.05) (0.05) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
        
        
Voice and Accountability Index -3.02 -2.89*** 0.00  -0.03 -0.19** -0.02 
 (2.38) (1.07) (0.02)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Voice and Accountability Index 0.63 0.67*** -0.03  0.01 0.02** 0.00 
x Migration Distance (0.51) (0.25) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
        
Political Stability Index -0.23 0.13 0.05***  -0.09 0.07 -0.19** 
 (0.52) (0.59) (0.01)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) 
Political Stability Index 0.04 -0.01 -0.06***  0.01 -0.01* 0.02** 
x Migration Distance (0.11) (0.14) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
        
Notes: Each column in each panel shows the results of one country-level indicator interacting with migration 
distance while controlling for all the other indicators. All models control for age of migration, gender, race, country 
of origin, and year of arrival (1990 - 2011). Migration distances are measured in 1000 km. Robust standard errors 





































































Table 1. Summary statistics of the analytical sample 
Notes: Sample is restricted to newly arrived immigrants from China, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India who aged 25 and above. (BL) denotes data from Barro-Lee dataset.  
 
 






Table 2. Determinants of Asian immigrants’ educational selection 
Notes: Sample includes newly arrived immigrants from China, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and India who aged 25 and above. Each column is based on an OLS regression model that additionally controls for age, gender, country of origin and time 
periods. Model (3) additionally controls for state of residency fixed effects.  
 
 













Table 3. Determinants of Asian immigrants’ occupational selection 
Notes: Sample includes newly arrived immigrants from China, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and India who aged 25 and above. Each column is based on an OLS regression model that additionally controls for age, gender, country of origin, and time 
periods. Model (3) additionally controls for state of residency fixed effects. 
 
 















Figure 1. Trends of Program Participation from 1994 to 2017 
Note: Data are from the March CPS 1995 to 2018 showing welfare use information from 1994 to 2017. The sample 
is restricted to household heads with a high school degree or less and at least one child <18. Cash and near-cash 








Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Low-Educated Households with Children 
 
 Native Households n = 254,413  
Immigrant Households  
n = 79,024  
 Mean  Mean  
Age 43.31   42.57  * 
Female 0.51  0.47 * 
Completed High school 0.76  0.42 * 
Race/Ethnicity     
Non-Hispanic White 0.68  0.11 * 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.16  0.05 * 
Hispanic 0.12  0.73 * 
Other Races/Ethnicities 0.04  0.11 * 
Marital Status     
Married 0.64  0.79 * 
Divorced 0.14  0.07 * 
Widowed 0.07  0.04 * 
Never Married 0.15  0.10 * 
Household Size     
2 People 0.14  0.07 * 
3 People 0.33  0.23 * 
4 People 0.30  0.30  
5 or More People 0.23  0.40 * 
Number of Children in the Household     
1 Child 0.46  0.33 * 
2 Children 0.33  0.34 * 
3 or More Children 0.20  0.33 * 
Number of Citizens in the Household     
All Members are Citizens 0.98  0.24 * 
At least One Citizen in the Household 0.02  0.63 * 
No Member is Citizen (all non-citizens) 0.00  0.12 * 
 
Note: Data are from the March CPS, 1995 to 2018. The sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or 
less education and at least one child younger than 18. * indicates that the means are statistically different between 







Figure 2. Trends of Participation in Safety-net Program from 1994 to 2017 
Note: Data are from the March CPS 1995 to 2018 showing welfare use information from 1994 to 2017. For TANF, 
SNAP and SSI, the sample is restricted to household heads with a high school degree or less and at least one child 
<18. For Medicaid, the sample is restricted to adults with a high school or less education. For CHIP, the sample is 







Figure 3. Adjusted Trends of Participation in Safety-net Program from 1994 to 2017 
Note: The trends are adjusted for age, education, gender, marital status, and race. Data are from the March CPS 
1995 to 2018 showing welfare use information from 1994 to 2017. For TANF, SNAP and SSI, the sample is 
restricted to household heads with a high school degree or less and at least one child <18. For Medicaid, the sample 
is restricted to adults with a high school or less education. For CHIP, the sample is restricted to children with high 






Table 2. Association between State Welfare Policy Score and the Business Cycle and Program 
Participation among Low-Educated Households with Children 
 
 
Cash and Near-Cash 
Assistance 
Social Safety Net 
Programs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
State Welfare Policy Score 0.913** 0.923** 1.016 1.027 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) 
     
Foreign-Born x  1.128*** 1.119*** 1.123*** 1.052* 
State Welfare Policy Score (0.036) (0.044) (0.023) (0.028) 
     
Unemployment rate 1.094*** 1.093*** 1.043*** 1.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) 
     
Foreign-born x 1.033*** 1.033*** 1.012 1.000 
Unemployment rate (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
Foreign-born x Individual 
Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Foreign-born x Household 
Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Foreign-born x State Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
     
N 333422 333422 333422 333422 
 
Note: Household data are from the March CPS 1995-2018 showing welfare use information from 1994 to 2017. The 
sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at least one child <18. Cash and 
near-cash programs include TANF, SNAP and SSI. Safety net programs include cash and near-cash programs, 
Medicaid and SCHIP. All models control for state and year fixed effects, individual characteristics (household 
heads’ age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and marital status), immigrant characteristics (household heads’ 
country of origin, cohort of immigration, year since immigration and citizenship status), household characteristics 
(number of children in the household and household size), and state immigrant-related policies (state dream act, 
driver’s license, E-Verify, Section 287(g) of Immigration and Naturalization Act, and the Secure Communities 
Program), and interaction terms between the foreign-born variable and state immigrant-related policy variables. 
Model 2 are the fully interacted models which include interactions between whether the respondent is foreign-born 
and all explanatory variables except for immigrant characteristics and year fixed effects. Coefficients in the table 
show exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) of logistic regression and robust standard errors clustered by state in 









Table 3. Association between Specific Safety Net Programs and Welfare Policies and the Business Cycle 
 TANF  SNAP  SSI  Medicaid  SCHIP 
          
State TANF policy 1.175* State SNAP policy 0.835*** State SSI policy 1.114*** State Medicaid policy 1.025 State CHIP policy 0.983 
for post-enactment (PE) (0.107) for PE new immigrants (0.054) for PE immigrants3 (0.035) for PE new immigrants (0.041) for PE new immigrants4 (0.042) 
new immigrants1          
          
State TANF policy  0.895 State SNAP policy  1.116   State Medicaid policy  1.009   
for PE old immigrants2 (0.116) For PE old immigrants (0.079)   for PE old immigrants (0.038)   
          
PE new immigrants x 0.859 PE new immigrants x 1.117 PE immigrants x 1.009 PE new immigrants x 1.131** PE new immigrants x 1.086 
State TANF policy  (0.107) State SNAP policy  (0.106) State SSI policy  (0.082) State Medicaid policy  (0.059) State CHIP policy  (0.083) 
for PE new immigrants  for PE new immigrants  for PE immigrants  for PE new immigrants  for PE new immigrants  
          
PE old immigrants x 1.025 PE old immigrants x 1.338***   PE old immigrants x 1.416***   
State TANF policy  (0.109) State SNAP policy  (0.141)   State Medicaid policy  (0.074)   
for PE old immigrants  for PE old immigrants    for PE old immigrants    
          
Unemployment rate 1.045* Unemployment rate 1.122*** Unemployment rate 1.006 Unemployment rate 1.015* Unemployment rate 1.034*** 
 (0.027)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
          
Foreign-born x 1.027* Foreign-born x 1.037*** Foreign-born x 1.011 Foreign-born x 1.007 Foreign-born x 1.043*** 
Unemployment rate (0.016) Unemployment rate (0.014) Unemployment rate (0.015) Unemployment rate (0.011) Unemployment rate (0.013) 
          
N 333422 N 333422 N 333422 N 1415132 N 591812 
 
Note: 1. Post-enactment (PE) new immigrants refer to those who arrived after 1996 and have stayed in the US for less than five years. 2. PE old immigrants refer to those who 
arrived after 1996 and have stayed for over five years. 3. For SSI, the policy variable is defined as whether the state had SSI for immigrants who arrived after 1996 and is 
interacted with being an immigrant who arrived after 1996. 4. For CHIP, the policy variable is defined as whether the state had CHIP for immigrant children who arrived after 
1996 and have lived in the US for less than five years and is interacted with being a PE new immigrant. For TANF, SNAP and SSI, the samples are restricted to low-educated 
households (household heads with a high school or less education) and at least one child <18. For Medicaid, the sample is restricted to adults. For SCHIP, the sample is restricted 
to children from low-educated households. All models control for state and year fixed effects, individual characteristics (age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and marital status), 
immigrant characteristics country of origin, cohort of immigration, year since immigration and citizenship status), household characteristics (number of children in the household 
and household size), and state immigrant-related policies (state dream act, driver’s license, E-Verify, Section 287(g) of Immigration and Naturalization Act, and the Secure 
Communities Program). All models are fully interacted which include interactions between whether the respondent is foreign-born and all explanatory variables except for 
immigrant characteristics and year fixed effects. Coefficients in the table show exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) of logistic regression and robust standard errors clustered by 






Table 4. Decomposition Results for Program Participation Gap between Low-Educated Native and 
Immigrant Headed Households with Children (Estimates from Linear Regression) 
 
 Cash and Near-Cash Assistance Safety Net Programs 
Overall Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE 
Panel 1        
Immigrants 0.206 *** 0.008 
 
0.479 *** 0.015 
Natives 0.229 *** 0.006 
 
0.382 *** 0.008 
Difference -0.023 *** 0.008 
 
0.096 *** 0.014 
Endowments (Explained) 0.050 *** 0.011 
 
0.094 *** 0.012 




0.011         
Panel 2: Endowments (Explained) 
       







Education (Whether Completed High School) 0.045 *** 0.004 
 
0.049 *** 0.005 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.023 ** 0.011  0.049 *** 0.011 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.038 *** 0.004 
 
0.045 *** 0.004 
        Non-Hispanic Black -0.006 *** 0.002 
 
-0.005 *** 0.001 

















State Unemployment Rate 0.009 ** 0.003 
 
0.006 ** 0.002 











-0.002 ** 0.001 
State Fixed Effects -0.017 ** 0.007 
 
-0.026 *** 0.008 
Year Fixed Effects 0.004 *** 0.001 
 
0.016 *** 0.003         
Panel 3: Coefficients (Unexplained) 
       
Reversed State Welfare Policy Score -0.016 * 0.009 
 
-0.042 *** 0.013 
∑Education 0.002  0.003  0.001  0.002 
        Did Not Complete High School -0.021 *** 0.002 
 
-0.019 *** 0.002 
        Completed High School 0.023 *** 0.002  0.020 *** 0.002 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.013 ** 0.006  0.022 *** 0.004 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.009 *** 0.002 
 
0.005 *** 0.002 











0.021 *** 0.004 




-0.003 * 0.001 





State Unemployment Rate -0.016  0.018  -0.010  0.029 











-0.010 * 0.006 
State Fixed Effects 0.014 ** 0.007 
 
0.028 *** 0.010 












        
Group 1: Immigrants. Number of Observations = 79,024  
Group 2: Natives. Number of Observations = 254,413 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at least one child <18. Cash 
and near-cash programs include TANF, SNAP and SSI. Safety net programs include cash and near-cash programs, 
Medicaid and SCHIP. “Other individual/household characteristics” include household heads’ age, gender, marital status, 









Table 5. Decomposition Results for Participation Gap in Specific Programs 
 TANF SNAP SSI Medicaid SCHIP 
Overall Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Panel 1                
Immigrants 0.040 *** 0.008 0.176 *** 0.009 0.147 *** 0.013 0.367 *** 0.023 0.441 *** 0.026 
Natives 0.050 *** 0.004 0.191 *** 0.006 0.136 *** 0.005 0.252 *** 0.007 0.454 *** 0.012 
Difference -0.009  0.006 -0.014 * 0.008 0.011  0.011 0.114 *** 0.019 -0.014  0.018 
Endowments (Explained) 0.019 ** 0.008 0.043 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.012 0.139 *** 0.015 0.028 *** 0.009 
Coefficients (Unexplained) -0.029 *** 0.004 -0.058 *** 0.008 -0.029 *** 0.009 -0.024 ** 0.011 -0.042 ** 0.020 
                
Panel 2: Endowments (Explained)                
Reversed State Welfare Policy Score 0.000  0.001 -0.002  0.002 0.001  0.002 0.002  0.001 0.000  0.001 
Education (Whether Completed High School) 0.012 *** 0.002 0.039 *** 0.004 0.015 *** 0.003 0.038 *** 0.004 -0.001 *** 0.000 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.006  0.005 0.022 ** 0.010 0.026 ** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.009 0.067 *** 0.009 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.013 *** 0.002 0.032 *** 0.003 0.021 *** 0.004 0.038 *** 0.004 0.059 *** 0.006 
        Non-Hispanic Black -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.002  0.001 -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.002 
        Hispanic -0.005  0.004 -0.007  0.007 0.004  0.008 0.005  0.005 0.015 *** 0.004 
        Other Races/Ethnicities 0.001 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.001 0.004 * 0.002 0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 
Other Individual/Household Characteristics -0.003 *** 0.001 -0.007 *** 0.003 -0.003 * 0.002 0.055 *** 0.005 -0.017 *** 0.002 
State Unemployment Rate 0.002 * 0.001 0.009 ** 0.004 0.002  0.002 0.002  0.001 0.001  0.001 
Immigrant Inclusion Policies -0.002 ** 0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.005 ** 0.003 0.002  0.002 0.001  0.001 
Immigrant Exclusion Policies 0.000  0.000 -0.001  0.001 -0.002  0.002 0.000  0.001 0.001  0.001 
State Fixed Effects 0.008  0.007 -0.019 ** 0.009 0.003  0.008 -0.006  0.007 -0.014 ** 0.006 
Year Fixed Effects -0.004 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.002 -0.009 ** 0.004 
                
Panel 3: Coefficients (Unexplained)                
Reversed State Welfare Policy Score 0.012 ** 0.005 -0.005  0.005 -0.012  0.016 -0.004  0.004 -0.001  0.006 
∑Education 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.002 -0.002  0.002 0.001  0.002 -0.002  0.006 
        Did Not Complete High School -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.016 *** 0.002 -0.004  0.004 -0.016 *** 0.002 -0.002  0.007 
        Completed High School 0.006 *** 0.001 0.018 *** 0.002 0.003  0.003 0.017 *** 0.002 0.000  0.000 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.003  0.002 0.013 ** 0.005 0.006  0.005 0.017 *** 0.003 -0.008  0.008 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.002 ** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002 0.009 ** 0.004 0.007 *** 0.002 0.014 *** 0.003 
        Non-Hispanic Black -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.002  0.003 -0.001  0.001 -0.007 *** 0.002 
        Hispanic 0.001  0.002 0.009 * 0.005 -0.003  0.006 0.014 *** 0.004 -0.016 * 0.009 
        Other Races/Ethnicities -0.001  0.001 -0.002  0.001 0.002  0.003 -0.002  0.002 0.000  0.002 
Other Individual/Household Characteristics -0.006 * 0.003 -0.017 ** 0.008 0.057 *** 0.016 -0.032 *** 0.004 0.220 *** 0.056 
State Unemployment Rate 0.000  0.011 -0.032 * 0.019 -0.005  0.028 0.004  0.020 0.053 * 0.030 
Immigrant Inclusion Policies 0.001  0.002 -0.001  0.003 -0.019 * 0.011 0.003  0.003 0.004  0.007 
Immigrant Exclusion Policies 0.003 * 0.002 -0.003  0.003 -0.015  0.010 -0.008 * 0.004 -0.004  0.006 
State Fixed Effects 0.001  0.003 0.012 ** 0.006 0.032 *** 0.011 0.030 *** 0.010 0.047 ** 0.020 
Year Fixed Effects -0.001  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.002  0.003 0.004 *** 0.001 -0.005 * 0.003 
Constant -0.043 *** 0.013 -0.025  0.022 -0.071 ** 0.030 -0.040 * 0.021 -0.345 *** 0.064 
                
Group 1: Immigrants Number of 
Observations 79,024   79,024   79,024   287,413   33,416   
Group 2: Natives. Number of Observations 254,413   254,413   254,413   1,127,719   558,396   
Note:  For TANF, SNAP and SSI, the samples are restricted to low-educated households (household heads with a high school or less education) and at least one child <18. 
For Medicaid, the sample is restricted to adults. For SCHIP, the sample is restricted to children from low-educated households. “Other individual/household 










Table 6. Decomposition Results for Participation Gap across Time Periods (Overall and Explained Differences) 
 1994 - 1996 1997 - 2002 2003 - 2007 2008 - 2012 2013 - 2017 
Cash and Near-Cash Assistance Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Panel 1                
Immigrants 0.263 *** 0.015 0.154 *** 0.012 0.145 *** 0.009 0.249 *** 0.011 0.264 *** 0.007 
Natives 0.230 *** 0.008 0.182 *** 0.007 0.204 *** 0.007 0.271 *** 0.007 0.296 *** 0.007 
Difference 0.034 *** 0.012 -0.028 *** 0.010 -0.059 *** 0.009 -0.022 ** 0.010 -0.032 *** 0.008 
Endowments (Explained) 0.100 *** 0.013 0.051 *** 0.012 0.025 ** 0.011 0.037 *** 0.012 0.032 *** 0.012 
Coefficients (Unexplained) -0.067 *** 0.014 -0.079 *** 0.011 -0.084 *** 0.010 -0.059 *** 0.010 -0.064 *** 0.012 
                
Social Safety Net Programs Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
Panel 2                
Immigrants 0.387 *** 0.021 0.352 *** 0.022 0.433 *** 0.023 0.546 *** 0.014 0.624 *** 0.013 
Natives 0.306 *** 0.009 0.302 *** 0.009 0.366 *** 0.009 0.446 *** 0.009 0.511 *** 0.009 
Difference 0.081 *** 0.018 0.050 *** 0.019 0.067 *** 0.022 0.100 *** 0.013 0.112 *** 0.012 
Endowments (Explained) 0.129 *** 0.018 0.081 *** 0.016 0.073 *** 0.015 0.073 *** 0.011 0.065 *** 0.010 
Coefficients (Unexplained) -0.047 *** 0.013 -0.030 ** 0.014 -0.006  0.015 0.027 ** 0.012 0.048 *** 0.011 
                
Group 1: Immigrants. Number of Observations = 79,024  
Group 2: Natives. Number of Observations = 254,413 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at least one child <18. Cash and near-cash programs include TANF, SNAP 
and SSI. Safety net programs include cash and near-cash programs, Medicaid and SCHIP. “Other individual/household characteristics” include household heads’ age, 
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 Today, there are about 250 million international migrants globally, and the number is 
increasing each year. Immigrants have contributed to the global economy, bridged cultural and 
business exchanges between host and home countries, and increased ethnic, racial, social, and 
cultural diversity in the host societies. Immigrants have also been overgeneralized about, 
misunderstood, scapegoated, and discriminated against. Understanding what drives international 
migration, who migrate, and how immigrants fare in destination has valuable theoretical, 
practical, and policy implications.  
This dissertation consists of three essays on international immigration. The first paper 
aims to test a series of immigration theories by studying immigrant skill-selection into South 
Africa and the United States. Most of the research on the determinants of immigrant skill 
selection has been focusing on immigrants in the United States and other developed destination 
countries. However, migration has been growing much faster in recent years between developing 
countries. This case study offers insights into the similarities and differences of immigration 
theories within the contexts of international migration into South Africa and the US. This project 
is funded by the Hamilton Research Fellowship of Columbia School of Social Work.  
 The second paper narrows down the focus onto Asian immigrants in the United States, 
studying how the skill-selection of Asian immigrants from different regions has evolved over the 
past four decades. Asian sending countries have experienced tremendous growth in their 
economy and educational infrastructure. The rapid development provides an excellent 
opportunity to test the theories on the associations between emigrants’ skill-selection and 
sending countries’ income, inequality, and education level. On the other hand, during the study 






followed by cutbacks in immigration policies. I study the association between immigration 
patterns and these policies to draw inferences on how the changes in immigration policies have 
affected the skill selection of Asian immigrants. This research is funded by Columbia University 
Weatherhead East Asia Institute’s Dorothy Borg Research Program Dissertation Research 
Fellowship.  
 The third paper centers on the less-educated immigrant groups in the US and investigates 
the gap in welfare use between less-educated immigrant and native households during 1995-
2018, spanning periods of economic recessions and recoveries, changes in welfare policy 
regimes, and policies towards immigrants. I use “decomposition analysis” to study to what 
extend demographic factors, macroeconomic trends, and welfare and immigration policy could 
explain the disparities in welfare participation between immigrants and natives. This paper is co-
authored with Dr. Neeraj Kaushal from Columbia School of Social Work and Dr. Julia Shu-Huah 
Wang from the University of Hong Kong. The work has been published in Population Research 







Chapter 1: Immigrant Skill-Selection: A Case Study of South Africa 
and the United States 
1.1 Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed significant shifts in global migration patterns. Once 
primarily a South to North phenomenon, migration has been growing much faster between the 
Southern hemisphere countries. By 2017, the global South hosted 97 million migrants from other 
countries in the South, surpassing the stock of South-to-North emigrants (United Nations, 2017). 
A significant proportion of South-South emigration is between developing countries. Scholars 
have advocated for more research on South-South migration, particularly emigration to 
developing countries, considering this development in recent decades (Gagnon, 2018). There is, 
however, little comparative research on how emigration to developing countries differs from 
migration from developing to developed countries. This paper contributes to the literature by 
studying economic, educational, political, geographic, and demographic factors associated with 
immigrant skill selection, measured as schooling (years of schooling or college education), in 
South Africa and the United States to test the theories related to immigrant selection in the two 
different destination countries.  
 Investigating the similarities and differences of emigration to a developing versus 
developed country is vital to understanding emerging global migration patterns. For instance, if 
there are differences in immigrant characteristics (immigrants’ relative skill selection) at the two 
destinations that might have implications for their integration and even the duration of their stay 
at the two destinations. From the standpoint of the receiving country, studying the determinants 






related policies to attract prospective immigrants with favorable demographic and human capital 
characteristics. From the sending country perspective, knowing who is more likely to emigrate 
under different circumstances can help the country adjust its policies and investment strategies 
related to its human capital development (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2001).  
At the individual level, adult immigrants’ level of human capital at arrival, to a large 
degree, determines their lives at the destination. Research has shown that after migration, 
immigrants’ labor market performance, welfare participation, and the cognitive and behavioral 
outcomes of their children are all robustly associated with immigrants’ human capital obtained in 
home countries (e.g., earnings: (Hendricks, 2002); welfare participation: (Bitler & Hoynes, 2013; 
Butcher & Hu, 2000); immigrant children: (Mistry, Biesanz, Chien, Howes, & Benner, 2008). 
From a policy-making and social service perspective, studying the determinants of immigrants’ 
human capital at arrival can be vital for developing legislations and services to improve 
immigrant wellbeing and integration in the host country.  
 Most of the research on this topic has been focusing on developed destination countries. 
The choice of destination countries in this study, namely South Africa and the US, is guided by 
essential similarities and contrasts between the two countries. South Africa is a significant hub 
for migration in Africa, and the US is the largest recipient of migrants globally. South Africa is a 
developing economic power in Africa; the US is a global superpower. Both are highly unequal 
economies: the US has one of the highest Gini-coefficient among rich countries, and South 
Africa has the highest Gini-coefficient, globally. Both countries have long histories of 
immigration, and the number of migrants has been increasing in both over the past decades. 
According to the United Nations Population Division (2015), the proportion of international 






number was 3.2% in 1990 and became 5.8% in 2015. More importantly, both countries have 
received large numbers of immigrants from European, African, and Asian countries. Particularly, 
Asia and Africa are likely to be the rising source of emigration globally. The factors that guide 
their choice of emigration can provide important insights into future migration trends.  
This paper investigates the social, economic, and political determinants of the educational 
attainment of migrants in South Africa and the United States who migrated after turning 25 from 
Europe, Africa, and Asia around the same period. Specifically, I study the association between 
migrants’ educational attainment and the following sending and host country characteristics: 1) 
size of the diaspora in the destination country, 2) sending countries’ economic indicators 
including GDP per capita and Gini index, 3) sending countries’ educational attainment among 
the general populations measured by average years of schooling, 4) sending countries’ level of 
voice and accountability in political institutions and the countries’ political stability and absence 
of violence. I also study the role of migration distance which is also a robust determinant of 
emigrant selection according to previous research (Beine et al., 2001; Belot & Hatton, 2012; 
Docquier, Lohest, & Marfouk, 2007). In supplementary analyses, I study if the distance between 
sending and receiving countries strengthen or attenuate the associations between factors 
mentioned above and immigrant skill selection (educational attainment at arrival) and whether 
these associations differ across the two destinations.  
Association between the size of diaspora and migrants’ education 
Many have studied the role of immigrant networks (or diaspora effect) on immigrant 
selection (skill level of migrants at arrival). Massey (1990) considered migrant network the most 
robust social determinant of immigrants’ origins in the South-North migration context. Migrant 






new migrants (Massey & España, 1987). Studies have found that the more extensive the previous 
migrant network in the destination, the less educated migrants might follow (Beine et al., 2001; 
Hatton, 2010; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007). Again, these studies have focused on rich 
destination countries, especially the United States, where family reunion programs are the major 
channels of immigration. It is not clear whether the same association would emerge in South 
Africa, where employment-based immigration channels are more common (Crush, 2008).  
Association between GDP and migrants’ education 
 The neoclassical economic theory predicts that potential migrants make moving decisions 
based on whether their expected future earnings at the destination to be higher than their earnings 
at home plus the pecuniary and non-pecuniary cost of migration (Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). At 
the macro-level, empirical studies have found that immigration flows have an inverted U-shaped 
relationship with sending country GDP, in that immigration rises with the sending country GDP 
up to a certain point and then begins to decline (Clemens, 2014). While the theory conceptualizes 
the relationship between economic development and emigration flow, it is unclear how 
emigrants’ educational attainment is associated with home countries’ economic development.  
 Further, empirical research on this topic mainly focuses on South-North migrations. A 
few studies found that immigrants with lower educational attainment in the rich receiving 
countries are more likely to be from poorer countries (Beine et al., 2001; Blien, Jahn, Stephan, 
Brücker, & Defoort, 2009; Docquier et al., 2007). However, Covarrubias, Lafortune, and 
Tessada (2015) found that home countries’ GDP per capita had a negative effect on migrants’ 
skill levels in the US. This is likely due to the poverty constraints in the sending countries that 
many less-educated people could not afford to migrate (Belot & Hatton, 2012; Clemens, 2014; 






Association between economic inequality and migrants’ education 
Borjas (1987) applied the Roy model of self-selection across occupations in the labor 
market to immigrant self-selection. Migrants possessing relatively more valued skills in the 
destination economy (than origin) can expect higher returns to migration and are thus more likely 
to move. Suppose the destination country offers higher labor market returns for high skills than 
low skills (e.g., to college-educated versus high school dropouts) relative to the sending country. 
The migrant flow will be positively selected. If instead, the destination economy offers relatively 
higher rewards for low skill relative to the sending area, the migrant flow will be negatively 
selected. In short, Borjas’s model predicts that migration from sending countries with a higher 
level of inequality would be relatively low-skilled (low educated) and vice versa.  
Empirical studies on this topic have supported the theory that relative inequality is an 
essential determinant of migrants’ skill level at arrival. For example, Kaestner and Malamud 
(2014), using data on Mexican male migrants in the US, support the Roy model that the relative 
level of inequality does matter. They found that the differential return to skills between the 
United States and Mexico drove the negative selection on earnings among this population. This 
finding can indicate that inequality is likely negatively associated with migrants’ education level 
at arrival as well. Among the few comparative studies on this topic, Kaushal and Lu (2015) 
compared migrants’ educational attainment at arrival in the US with Canada. They found 
evidence to support Borjas’s model that migrants from countries with higher levels of inequality 
were less educated in both destination countries.  
Association between political institutions and migrants’ education 
Another set of sending country determinants of migrants’ education is the quality of 






(Ariu, Docquier, & Squicciarini, 2016; Cooray & Schneider, 2016). Studies focused on OECD 
destinations found that worse political institutions in the countries of origin can be a push factor 
for high-skilled emigrants; and less skilled emigrants were more likely to migrate when the 
corruption level was low (Ariu et al., 2016; Cooray & Schneider, 2016; Dimant, Krieger, & 
Meierrieks, 2013). This is perhaps because corruption often led to greater tax burdens for high-
income groups, and weak political structures also motivated the high-income groups to migrate 
(Dimant et al., 2013). Dutta and Roy (2011) found that good accountability and stability within 
the political institutions were associated with fewer skilled emigrations for both developed and 
developing countries of origin. However, Arif (2020) found that political institutions were not as 
significant a push factor of emigration as the economic and social factors.  
Role of migration distance 
Besides looking at the social (i.e., migrant network), economic (i.e., GDP and inequality), 
and political determinants of migrants’ schooling, studies have also factored in the restraint 
caused by moving costs. A recent study using county-level data for 70 source countries and 21 
OECD destination countries found that the impact of wage incentives on migrants’ education 
could only be observed when poverty constraints and moving costs from the source country were 
considered (Belot & Hatton, 2012). Studies have used the distance between the sending and 
destination countries as an indicator of moving costs and found that the education level of 
migrants to the rich nations was positively associated with the distance between sending and 
destination countries (Beine et al., 2001; Docquier et al., 2007). It is not that the low-skilled 
workers do not want to migrate to a place with a relatively better return to skills. This group of 







Based on this review of the theories of migration and empirical evidence from past 
research, I test the following hypotheses in the current paper. First, the size of diasporas in the 
destination is negatively associated with migrants’ education level. A larger diaspora lowers the 
risk of migration and makes it worthwhile for less-educated persons from sending countries to 
migrate. Second, sending country’s per capita GDP is likely positively associated with migrants’ 
education, and sending country’s economic inequality is negatively associated with migrants’ 
education. Highly educated emigrants are more likely to be from richer and more equal sending 
countries. Third, the level of accountability and stability of sending country’s political 
institutions are likely negatively associated with migrants’ education level. In other words, 
countries with less corruption and a greater degree of political stability are less likely to 
encourage highly educated persons to emigrate.  
My study’s contribution to the literature is threefold. I study the social, economic, and 
political determinants of international migration to offer a more holistic view on the theories 
related to immigrant skill selection. I investigate these relationships first by destination and then 
by both destination and regions of origin to provide insights into how these factors might predict 
migration differently among developing and developed home and destination countries. Lastly, I 
include a geographical dimension in the model to see how migration distance, an indicator of 
migration costs, can attenuate the relationships between social, economic, and political 
characteristics of sending countries and international migration from Asia, Africa, and Europe 
into South Africa and the United States.  
1.2 Data 
This study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 






percent random sample of the population based on the country’s 2011 census. The US sample is 
from the American Community Survey for 2007-2011, a 5-in-100 national random sample 
(Ruggles et al., 2020). The American Community Survey is the largest household survey that the 
Census Bureau administers. The large sample sizes of the two destination countries permit 
analyses on recent immigrants from Europe, Africa, and Asia over the years. For the analyses, 
the sample is restricted to foreign-born adults who migrated at age 25 or older to South Africa or 
the US between 1990 and 2011 and are originally from Africa, Asia, or Europe. Because the 
purpose of the study is to investigate the determinants of migrants’ educational selection, namely 
education level at arrival, the age restriction reduces the possibility of including migrants who 
received education in the destination countries.  
The primary outcomes are migrant’s years of schooling coded as a continuous variable 
from 0-16 years and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent had some college or 
higher education. The datasets are rich in demographic and migration information. Covariates in 
the regression analyses include age of migration, gender, race, country of origin, and year of 
immigration. Female is a dummy variable (1 for females and 0 for males). Race is captured by a 
set of dummy variables indicating whether the individual is white (reference category), Black, 
Asian, or other races.  
The sizes of migrant network (diasporas) are from the United Nation’s dataset on the 
migrant stock by origin and destination from 1990 to 2011 (United Nations, 2019). GDP per 
capita is from the World Bank Open Data and is measured in current US dollars (The World 
Bank, 2019). GINI indices of market income inequality are from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2020). The SWIID incorporates comparable GINI indices of 






the comparability of income inequality. The variable is measured by an index between 0 and 1, 
with the larger value indicating a higher level of economic inequality.  
The quality of the home countries’ political institutions is measured by variables from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2019) from 1996 to 
2011. Values for earlier years (1990-1995) are imputed using linear extrapolation. I use two 
measures: the “voice and accountability” index and the “political stability and violence” index. 
Both indices range between -2.5 and 2.5, with a higher value indicating a greater degree of 
freedom among the citizens to participate in selecting their government, as well as greater 
freedom of expression, association, and media in case of the former index and greater political 
stability and absence of violence for the latter index.  
The sending countries’ average years of schooling from 1990 to 2011 are from UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2019) and Barro and Lee (2013). 
The variable is measured by the average years of education received by people 25 and older in 
the country. Distance between sending and receiving country is used as an indicator of migration 
costs and is estimated using the geographical data of country coordinates from the UNIGIS 
Geospatial Education Resources (Strobl, 2014). It is calculated using the straight-line distance 
between the two countries’ geometric center points in 1000 kilometers.  
1.3 Empirical Strategy 
I use linear regression models as shown by Equation (1) for the South Africa sample and 
the US sample separately. The regression models are motivated by the theories outlined in the 
previous sections. The key outcomes of interest are the educational attainment of migrants at 
arrival, which are modeled as a function of sending country’s average years of schooling, 






destination; as well as individual migrant characteristics including age of migration, gender, race, 
and year of arrival (𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡) and sending country (𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠) fixed effects.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼1ln(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼2ln(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼5𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛼𝛼6𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼9𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡  
 
The outcome of the regression models is migrant i’s education level at arrival measured 
by years of schooling and whether the migrant i had some college or higher education in year t, 
the year of emigration. The models control for the log value of the size of migrant network (the 
stock of migrant populations from the same sending country s) (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡), the log value of 
GDP per capita (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡), GINI index (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡), and political indicators including indices of voice 
and accountability (𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) and political stability (𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) of sending country s 
in year t. To examine if immigrants are positively or negatively drawn from the sending country 
population, I also run a model that includes the sending country’s average years of schooling 
(𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) as an explanatory variable.  
To study if migration distance moderates the relationship between sending countries’ 
characteristics and migrants’ selection. I then divide the sample by regions of origin and run the 
same regression models for migrants from Asia, Europe, and Africa separately to see how the 
associations differ across different regions of origin.  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1ln(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2ln(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3ln(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡







In the next step, I interact country-level indicators with the distance (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠) one at a time 
while controlling for all the other indicators in the model. Migration distances are the straight-
line distances from the geometric center of source country s to the destination country and are 
measured in 1000 km. Equation (2) shows an example of interacting migration distance with the 
log value of the size of migrant network. All regression models control the same individual 
characteristics as the ones in Equation (1), plus sending country fixed effects and year of 
migration fixed effects. I use robust standard errors clustered on the country-year of arrival for 
all regression models to adjust for heteroskedasticity (Huber, 1967).  
1.4 Results 
 Figure 1. shows the distribution of educational attainment at arrival among migrants who 
migrated at age 25 or older between 1990 and 2011 from Africa, Asia, or Europe (AAE migrants 
hereafter) to South Africa and the United States. 67.8% of the AAE migrants in the US versus 
13.9% in South Africa had some college education (13 or more years of schooling). About a 
quarter of the AAE migrants in the US versus 68.8% in South Africa had middle to high school 
education (7-12 years of schooling). 6.9% of AAE migrants in the US and 17.3% in South Africa 
had primary school or less education (6 or fewer years of schooling). Briefly, most of the AAE 
migrants in the US during the study period were college-educated, and most of the AAE 
migrants in South Africa had middle to high school level schooling. Appendix Table 1 shows 
other individual-level characteristics. To summarize, AAE immigrants in South Africa migrated 
at a younger age compared to those in the US. AAE migrants in South Africa are more likely 
male (64% of the sample) and, as expected, Black (86%). AAE migrants in the US are more 






 Table 1 further breaks down the sample by regions of origin and shows the means of 
outcomes and country-level characteristics. The education level of newly arrived AAE migrants 
to the US did not differ significantly across regions of origin. Whereas in South Africa, European 
migrants were more educated, followed by Asian and then African migrants. Only 9.4% of 
African migrants in South Africa had some college education. As expected, European sending 
countries in the sample were richer, had better-educated populations, and higher ratings of 
political institutions in both South Africa and the US samples than Asian and African sending 
countries. Asian and African migrants in South Africa and African migrants in the US were from 
countries with relatively low GDP per capita, averaging around 700 to 1,100 USD. Asian 
migrants in the US, compared to those in South Africa, were from much richer Asian countries. 
Immigrants to the US and South Africa had somewhat similar origins in terms of sending 
country inequality. Appendix Table 2 presents a complete list of countries of origin included in 
the analytical sample. There was a total of 92 sending countries - 28 African, 26 Asian, and 38 
European.  
Table 2 shows the OLS regression results for all AAE migrants, with years of schooling 
and proportion with a college education as outcomes, by destination. I present models with and 
without controlling for sending country average years of schooling. All models include controls 
for age of migration, gender, race, country of origin, and year of migration. As expected, the 
results show that a one percent increase in the size of migrant networks in the US was associated 
with about 0.65 fewer years of schooling for AAE migrants in the US. AAE migrants in both 
South Africa and the US were less likely to have college education if larger migrant networks 






A one percent increase in sending countries’ GDP per capita was associated with about 
0.64 fewer years of schooling for AAE immigrants in South Africa. Likewise, a one percent 
increase in sending countries’ per capita GDP was associated with a three percentage points 
decline in the probability of having some college education. In South Africa, AAE immigrants’ 
education appeared to be negatively associated with sending countries’ economic inequality 
(GINI index).  
Sending countries’ index of voice and accountability was found positively associated 
with the educational attainments among AAE migrants in the US. Political stability in the home 
countries was negatively associated with AAE migrants’ education when arriving in the US. The 
associations between sending countries’ political institution indices and AAE migrants’ 
education when arriving in South Africa were not statistically significant.  
Table 3 and Table 4 show the OLS regression results for migrants’ educational 
attainment by region of origin. The first three columns in Table 3 and 4 are for AAE migrants in 
the South Africa sample, and the last three columns are for AAE migrants in the US sample. All 
models control for age of migration, gender, race, country of origin, and year of migration.  
Consistent with previous findings, across all three regions, AAE immigrants’ education in the 
US was negatively associated with the size of migrant networks in the US. The diaspora effect 
appeared to be different in South Africa. In the case of European and African immigrants, an 
increase in the size of diaspora was associated with a decline in the educational attainment of 
new migrants (though the results are statistically insignificant), but Asian immigrants were likely 
more educated if there were larger Asian diasporas in South Africa. The Asian sending countries 






The coefficient on GDP per capita was statistically significant only in regressions when 
the samples were restricted to African migrants in South Africa and Asian migrants in the US. In 
both cases, the associations were negative, suggesting that in these two cases, as home countries 
became richer, emigrants were less selective in terms of education.  
An increase in home countries’ economic inequality was associated with a higher 
proportion of college-educated African migrants in the US but a lower proportion of college-
educated African migrants in South Africa. The result suggests that severe economic inequality 
in African countries was more likely to push highly educated Africans to migrate to the US. 
Whereas South Africa, which has the highest GINI index in the world, was more likely to attract 
less-educated immigrants from other unequal African countries.  
An increase in source countries’ index of voice and accountability was associated with an 
increase in education level among European and Asian migrants in the US. The level of political 
stability in Asian and African home countries was negatively associated with migrants’ 
educational attainment when moving to the US. In South Africa, Asian home countries’ political 
stability was found positively associated with new migrants’ education when arriving in South 
Africa. The results show that political factors appear to have different effects for migrants from 
different regions in different destinations, which could be a reason why previous research that 
computed average effects across sending and receiving countries, found that political stability in 
home countries had insignificant effects on migration into OECD destinations (Dutta & Roy, 
2011).  
Table 5 and Table 6 present how migration distance moderates the relationships between 
the country-level characteristics and migrants’ educational attainment. In the analyses, migration 






associated with increased selection in terms of years of schooling and having some college 
education among AAE migrants in South Africa and the US. For instance, the results show that 
for AAE migrants in South Africa, the greater distance was associated with a more positive 
relationship between home countries’ voice and accountability index and migrants’ education 
level for those from countries that were farther away from South Africa and was found 
associated with a less negative relationship for those from closer countries. This suggests that for 
potential AAE migrants, while factors like a lower degree of freedom might encourage more 
educated emigration, distance further increases the risk of migration and is often associated with 
higher migration cost, thus makes the emigration even more selective.  
Similar to the findings in Table 3 and 4, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the 
associations among country-level factors, migration distance, and migrants’ education level at 
arrival differed for migrants from different regions. When interpreting the results involving 
interactions, it is important to take into account the mean values of migration distances (see 
Table 1). The results show that for Asian and African immigrants in South Africa, greater 
migration distances were associated with less positive relationships between the size of diasporas 
and migrants’ years of schooling. For Asian sending countries, the distances to South Africa 
range from approximately 3900 km (e.g., India) to 5400 km (e.g., China). Based on the distances 
and the coefficients, the greater distance was associated with a more negative relationship 
between the size of migrant network and the education level of migrants from farther countries 
like China, and a less positive one for migrants from relatively closer countries like India. 
Similarly, for African migrants in South Africa, based on the distance range of approx. 400 km 






negative relationship between the size of diasporas and migrants’ education from those from 
farther countries, and a less positive one for migrants from adjacent countries.  
The relationship between Asian countries’ GDP and Asian migrants’ education in South 
Africa became less positive for farther Asian sending countries. Greater distances were 
associated with a more negative relationship between African countries’ GDP and their migrants’ 
education when arriving in South Africa. Greater distances were associated with a less positive 
relationship between European countries’ GDP and their migrants’ education when arriving in 
the US. For African migrants in the US, the greater distance was associated with a more negative 
relationship between the home country GDP and migrants’ education for those from farther 
countries and a less positive one for migrants from closer countries.  
For AAE migrants in South Africa and African migrants in the US, an increase in 
distance was associated with a more negative relationship between home countries’ GINI index 
and migrants’ education for those from farther countries, and a less positive one for migrants 
from closer countries. Similar relationships can be observed for Asian and African migrants in 
South Africa, where greater distance was found associated with a more negative relationship 
between home countries’ average years of schooling and migrants’ education for those from 
farther countries, and a less positive one for migrants from closer countries. For African migrants 
in South Africa, greater migration distance was associated with a less positive relationship 
between home countries’ stability and migrants having some college education when arriving in 
South Africa. For European and African migrants in the US, greater migration distance was 
associated with a more positive relationship between home countries’ stability and migrants’ 






1.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
 This study investigates the source country-level demographic, economic, and political 
determinants of immigrants’ education at arrival (selection) in the US and South Africa. 
Consistent with previous literature, the size of migrant network, was associated with negative 
selection among AAE immigrants in the US. But the diaspora effects work differently in the 
South Africa context. The developing countries are relatively new international migration 
destinations and are usually not as diverse compared to the traditional developed destination 
countries. For South Africa, the study found that an increase in the size of Asian Diaspora was 
associated with the emigration of more highly educated Asians. It is possible that the migration 
patterns were driven by state-funded initiatives and international collaborations that have 
increased the mobility of highly educated migrants between developing countries such as South 
Africa and China (Chen, Huynh, & Park, 2010).  
The hypothesis based on the neoclassical literature also does not hold in the South Africa 
context. Lower GDP per capita in African countries was associated with more educated 
emigration to South Africa, and the negative association was amplified for farther sending 
countries. The results suggest that in developing countries, less-educated people are more likely 
to be constrained by poverty, therefore, cannot make a move. Whereas wealthier classes in 
poorer countries are more likely to migrate to maximize potential gain in income. It is also 
possible that for developing countries such as South Africa, it is more difficult to attract highly 
educated migrants from richer countries. The results also show that higher economic inequality 
and political instability could push more highly educated migration from Asian and African 






and Asia, besides economic development, economic equality and political stability are equally, if 
not more, important in preventing brain drain.  
This study is not without its limits. For analytical models with both country of origin and 
year of arrival fixed effects, obtaining adequate sample sizes for each country-year unit can be 
challenging. Also, the country-level factors included in the models are complicated 
measurements that correlate and interact with each other. The relationships among these 
variables warrant further investigation. While this study presents the determinants of immigrants’ 
education at arrival by three different regions, each region contains vastly different cultures and 
other unobserved factors. International migration into South Africa offers some insights on how 
theories on immigrant selection can be different in a developing country context. The findings of 
this case study on South Africa especially contradicts some of the conventional theories based on 
evidence from the developed world. However, as a case study specifically on South Africa and 
the US, the findings of the study do not represent international migration in other countries. 
Additional country-specific research on international migration between developing countries is 






Chapter 2: Brain Gain from Asia: Educational and Occupational 
Selection of Asian Migrants into the United States 
2.1 Introduction 
Asians are one of the fastest-growing demographic groups in the United States. Since 
2000, immigration from Latin America has slowed, and net migration from Asia has surpassed 
Latin America (Passel, D’Vera Cohn, Gonzalez-Barrera, & Center, 2012). While Hispanics will 
likely become the largest ethnic group in the US, Asian are projected to be the largest immigrant 
group, surpassing Hispanic migrants between 2045 and 2055, making up 34% to 36% of all 
immigrant population in the nation (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021; Hanna & Batalova, 2021).  
The Asian population in the US is highly diverse, hailing from over 20 countries of East 
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian sub-continent (Budiman & Ruiz, 2021). While there is a 
large literature on the selection patterns (characteristics at arrival) of Latin American and 
European immigrants in the US, researchers have paid much less attention to the selection 
pattern of Asian immigrants. This paper aims to bridge this knowledge gap. 
The paper has three aims. First, I study how the skill-selection of Asian immigrants 
(specifically, educational attainment and professional abilities) from different regions has 
evolved over the past four decades, how it relates to the changing skills of non-migrant 
populations in Asia, and how it relates to the changing skill-composition of the non-Asian 
immigrants and that of the US population. I use six measures to capture the skills of new 
immigrants: years of schooling, proportion with college or more education, proportion with high-
school or less education, proportion of college-educated professionals, proportion of college-
educated STEM professionals, and proportion of college-educated non-STEM professionals. 






using a sample of newly arrived Asian immigrants. Most previous research has either focus on 
all immigrants or immigrants from Europe or Latin America. Finally, I adopt a regression 
discontinuity design within the descriptive framework of this study to draw inference on the role 
of US immigration policy on the changing skill selection of newly arrived Asian immigrants. 
The story of changing skill profile (educational and occupational profile) of newly 
arrived Asian immigrants during 1980-2019 can provide valuable policy implications. US 
immigration policies are routinely criticized for being inefficient and outdated (Gower, 2011; 
Ibarraran & Lubotsky, 2007). Aimed to improve the skill profile of immigrants, the Immigration 
Act of 1990 increased the employment quota for immigration and introduced non-immigrant 
visas for high-educated immigrants such as the H1-B. The H1-B visa quotas experienced severe 
cutbacks and expansions as the needs of the technology sector experienced booms and bursts. I 
used the analysis to draw inferences about the effect of these changes in H1-B policy on the 
Asian immigrant selection during this period.  
The economic prosperity of Asian countries over time also provides an excellent 
opportunity to test the theories pertaining to how sending countries’ income, inequality, and 
education level of the population are associated with Asian migrants’ education and occupation 
when arriving in the US. This study can provide insightful perspectives for policymakers and 
business decision-makers to adapt to the changing demographics of Asian migrant workers. For 
sending countries, the analysis can shed light on whether better income, education, economic 
equality can help attenuate or accelerate “brain drain” from Asian countries. For host countries, 
studying immigrant skill-selection can help evaluate immigration policies to avoid “brain 






For immigrants, their educational attainment and professional abilities at arrival largely 
determine the livelihoods at the destination. Research has shown that migrants’ education level at 
arrival is a robust determinant of their labor market outcomes (Hendricks, 2002), welfare 
participation (Bitler & Hoynes, 2013; Huang, Kaushal, & Wang, 2020), and the well-being of 
their children in the destination (Mistry, Biesanz, Chien, Howes, & Benner, 2008). At the same 
time, immigrant workers from Asia are a diverse group in terms of age and socioeconomic 
status, and the overall statistics conceal the wide variations of their human capital levels 
(Budiman & Ruiz, 2021). The most recent reports on Asian immigrants in the US highlighted the 
aggregated trends of migration flow and education. Still, none have provided a longitudinal and 
nuanced review of Asian immigrants’ educational and occupational selection into the US.  
A very brief history of immigration policies for Asians in the United States 
The first major wave of Asian-origin immigrants was predominantly contracted workers 
from China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, working at plantations and settlements in Hawaii 
in the 1830s. By the 1850s, many Chinese laborers moved to California during the Gold Rush. 
Driven by the labor demand, Japanese, Korean, and South Asian immigrants also migrated to the 
US around the late 1800s (Takaki, 2012). Nativist hostility to Asian migrants, primarily Chinese 
men, intensified in the late 19th century and led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that 
prohibited all channels of immigration from China except special merchants, diplomats, and 
students.  
For a few years, male migrants from Japan and a few other Asian countries filled the void 
of labor demand due to a decrease in immigration from China. However, in 1907, the Japanese 
government signed the Gentlemen’s agreement restricting Japanese immigration to the US. After 






farmworkers to fill the increased labor demand in Hawaii and the US mainland. The migration 
trend only lasted until 1934, when the Tydings-Mcduffie Act (also known as the Philippine 
Commonwealth and Independence Act) promised independence to the Philippines and, at the 
same time, capped Filipino immigration with a quota of 50 persons per year.  
Additional exclusive legislations toward Asian immigrants, including the Asiatic Barred 
Zone Act (Immigration Act of 1917) and Johnson-Reed Act (Immigration Act of 1924), ushered 
the United States into an era during which nearly all immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere 
came under severe restrictions, and immigration from Asian countries fell dramatically (S. S.-H. 
Lee, 2015).  
After World War II, the restrictive policies toward Asian migrants gradually phased out. 
The Magnuson Act of 1943 ended 62 years of Chinese exclusion and offered a pathway to 
citizenship for Chinese immigrants. The Luce-Celler Act of 1946 expanded the immigration 
quota and permitted a pathway to citizenship for Filipino and Indian immigrants. In 1952, the 
McCarran-Walter Act permitted all non-white immigrants to become naturalized citizens but 
maintained a low annual quota of 100 persons per country from Asia until the enactment of the 
Hart-Celler Act of 1965, which replaced its exclusionary predecessors and largely expanded 
family reunification as the major pathway for immigration to the US. The 1965 Immigration Act 
eliminated the original quota system and set an annual cap of 20,000 immigrants per country and 
170,000 in total for migrants from the Eastern Hemisphere (E. Lee, 2015; S. S.-H. Lee, 2015).  
From 1975 to 2010, due to the warfare in Southeast Asia, 1.2 million Vietnamese, Lao, 
Hmong, and Cambodian people, mostly refugees, migrated to the US (E. Lee, 2015). The 






attainment and professional abilities among Asian immigrants in the US. It is important to keep 
that in mind when studying the trends in selection among less-educated Asian immigrants.  
The most recent milestone immigration policy, the Immigration Act of 1990, created five 
distinct employment-based visas that explicitly favored highly skilled workers to overcome the 
labor supply shortage in technology industries. The H1-B visa program, the largest employment-
based classification, was created with an annual 65,000 caps for foreign persons in professional 
and specialty occupations. The Senate expanded the quota for the H1-B visa to 115,000 in 1999 
and then further raised the program cap to 195,000 in 2001 via the enactment of the American 
Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act (AC21 Act) (Kumar, 2020). Based on available 
data for 2007 to 2017 from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (2017), 
Asian workers have been the largest group of H1-B visa recipients.  
Theoretical Issues 
Theories regarding immigrant selection have focused on county-level predictors of 
migrants’ education and skills at arrival, including the size of migrant network (or the size of the 
diasporas) in the destination country and income and inequality in the sending country. The 
larger the stock of previously migrated countrymen and women can lower migration costs and 
provide greater access to helpful information for new migrants (Massey & España, 1987). 
Studies have found that the more extensive the previous migrant network at the destination, the 
less educated migrants might follow (Beine, Docquier, & Rapoport, 2001; Hatton, 2010; 
McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007).  
Sending countries’ economic development influences emigrants’ human capital levels. 
Studies have found that migrants from poorer countries are more likely to be less educated  






Marfouk, 2007). In relation to economic inequality, Borjas’s model of self-selection predicts that 
migration from sending countries with a higher level of inequality would be relatively low-
skilled (low educated) and vice versa (Borjas, 1987). Because less-skilled workers are less 
rewarded in highly unequal places than relatively equal societies, they are more likely to migrate 
to more equal societies. Research on this topic primarily focused on Mexican immigrants or the 
entire immigrant population in the US. For example, Kaestner and Malamud (2014) found that 
the higher level of inequality in Mexico, relative to the US, was associated with lower earnings 
among Mexican male migrants in the US. This finding supports the theory that inequality is 
likely negatively associated with migrants’ education level at arrival. Kaushal and Lu (2015) 
compared migrants’ educational attainment at arrival in the US with Canada and found that in 
both destination countries, migrants from countries with higher levels of inequality were less 
educated.  
Education and economic development in Asia 
In the past four decades, many Asian countries have undergone rapid economic 
development and demographic transitions. The purchasing power adjusted real GDP of the 
region1 increased from about $3.3 trillion in 1980 to about $25 trillion in 2009, an increase of 7.5 
times in 30 years of time (Lee & Hong, 2010). Although developing Asia’s per capita GDP is 
below the global average but has been growing at a much faster rate compared to other regions. 
In 1980 the income of an average Asian was about a quarter of the global average. By 2009, the 
number is about two-thirds of the global average (Lee & Hong, 2010). In recent years, economic 
growth in Asia is still the strongest compared to other regions. In 2018, the GDP growth of the 
 
1 Here the authors use the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; 
Malaysia; Pakistan; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei, China; Thailand; and Viet Nam as a sample. The author 
pointed out that these economies account for about 95% of emerging Asia’s GDP, and are thus representative of 






Asia-Pacific region was estimated at 5.4 percent, leading the economic growth globally 
(Vashakmadze, 2020).  
Asians are also becoming more educated. In 1991, there were about 24 million tertiary 
students in the Asia-Pacific region, among 68 million tertiary students in the entire world. By 
2007, the number of tertiary students in Asia-Pacific had grown to 74 million, nearly half of the 
world’s 153 million tertiary students (Marginson, Kaur, & Sawir, 2011). From 1995 to 2007, the 
number of internationally published scientific papers from Asia grew from 76,922 to 167,389, an 
increase of 141.8 percent. In comparison, the corresponding increase was 25.5 percent for 
European Union and 8.5 percent for the United States (Marginson et al., 2011). Moreover, the 
demand for better education has been growing even faster in Asian nations. Since the 1990s, 
China and India have become the largest sources of international students in the world (Li & 
Zhang, 2011). In 1980, China sent 6,124 international students to study abroad. In 2009, over 
229,300 Chinese students went to study overseas. The number increased to over 662,100 in 2018 
(Textor, 2020).  
The latest research on Asian immigrants’ skill-selection 
Immigrants are not random samples of sending countries’ populations (Borjas, 1987). In 
the United States, the countries of origin substantially determine immigrants’ earnings at arrival 
(Borjas, 1992), and sending countries’ characteristics impact immigrants’ demographics, 
educational, and labor market outcomes (Belot & Hatton, 2012). There were an estimated 14 
million Asian immigrants in the US in 2019 (Hanna & Batalova, 2021), but the trends and 
theories in Asian immigrants’ education and occupation have not been thoroughly researched.  
In the most recent study published by the Migration Policy Institute, Hanna and Batalova 






immigrants’ population sizes, geographic distribution, and socioeconomic indicators. They found 
that Asian immigrants, on average, had higher educational attainment than US natives and 
immigrants from other regions in 2019. And Asian countries are the primary sources of 
international students for US universities.  
The report also found that over half of Asian immigrants were in managerial, business, 
science, and arts occupations, a proportion that is much higher than US natives and immigrants 
from other regions. Only a minimal share of Asian immigrants was employed in farming and 
other manual labor occupations (Hanna & Batalova, 2021).  
As mentioned in the previous section, Asian immigrants are diverse (Budiman & Ruiz, 
2021). For example, more than half of the immigrants from India and China had an advanced 
degree, but less than 20% of immigrants from Cambodia and Laos had a college education. The 
occupation among Asian immigrants also varies by country of origin. Over 70% of immigrants 
from India and Taiwan were in management positions. However, over one-third of immigrants 
from Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam were in service or production occupations (Hanna 
& Batalova, 2021).  
This report offers valuable information on all Asian immigrants’ demographics and 
socioeconomic status. However, so far, no study has systematically studied the long-term pattern 
and determinants of Asian immigrant’s skill selection. The present study aims to fill the gap by 
1) studying the changing patterns of Asian immigrants’ educational attainment and professional 
abilities at arrival over the past four decades; 2) empirically testing the theories on how country-
level factors predict immigrant skill-selection using a sample of newly arrived Asian immigrants; 
3) adopting the regression discontinuity method to strengthen the possible causal relationship 







Data are from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). The 1980, 1990, and 
2000 samples are census-based, five percent random sample of the US population. The data for 
2001 to 2019 are from the American Community Survey (ACS). The American Community 
Survey annually surveys a small percentage of the population on a rotating basis throughout the 
decade, asking for information previously only requested in the long form of the decennial 
census, including citizenship, migration, education, and employment-related variables (Ruggles 
et al., 2021). It is the largest household survey that the Census Bureau administers. These 
datasets have a large and nationally representative sample and are rich in individuals’ 
demographics, education, and occupations over the years to suffice the analytical models.  
The analytical sample is restricted to newly arrived immigrants (in the US for one year or 
less) aged 25 and older. The primary outcomes are migrant’s years of schooling coded 
continuously from 0-20 years, a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent had college 
or higher education, and a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent had high school or 
less education. For occupational outcomes, the primary variable is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the respondent was a college-educated professional in management, business, science, 
or art occupations based on census and ACS categories. Two secondary occupational outcomes 
are dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was a college-educated STEM or non-
STEM professional.  
Sending country characteristics include average years of schooling, GDP per capita, and 
GINI coefficient. GDP per capita is from the World Bank Open Data and is measured in 2019 
US dollars (The World Bank, 2019). GINI indices of market income inequality are from the 






by an index between 0 and 1, with the larger value indicating a higher level of economic 
inequality. The sending countries’ average years of schooling from 1990 to 2019 are from 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) (2019) and Barro and Lee (2013). The variable is 
measured by the average number of years of education received by people 25 and older. Sending 
countries’ proportion of college-educated and proportion of high school or less educated among 
people 25 and older from 1980 to 2010 are from Barro and Lee (2013). Appendix Table 1 
presents years of schooling from both the UNESCO and Barro-Lee. Both sources provide similar 
statistics. The UNESCO data was used as the primary outcome due to more available time 
points. The size of diasporas in the US is calculated based on the personal weights provided by 
the census and ACS data (Ruggles et al., 2021).  
2.3 Empirical Strategy 
 The first part of the analysis compares the educational and occupational outcomes of 
working-age (25-64) US-born persons with working-age newly arrived (in the US for one year or 
less) Asian immigrants and non-Asian immigrants during seven time points/periods (1980, 1990, 
2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2016-2019). I use STATA’s margins plot to 
present the differences of the outcomes for the population groups at each time period at 0.05 
confidence intervals. The same comparisons were made for separate age groups (25-34, 35-44, 
45-54, and 55-64). Appendix Table 2 shows the distribution of age groups in the sample. I then 
compare the educational and occupational selection of working-age newly arrived immigrants 
from three major Asian regions (South Asians, Southeast Asians, and East Asians) with those of 






 I then compare the educational level of newly arrived immigrants in the US with non-
migrants in their home countries. I included 12 major Asian countries with an adequate number2 
of observations in the data (China, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India). I consolidate the average years of 
schooling, the proportion with college or above education, and the proportion with high school or 
less education among non-migrants 25 and older using aggregated data. Appendix Table 1 shows 
the means for each country at each time period. I compare the aggregated means with the same 
measures of the newly arrived Asian immigrants 25 and older from these countries in the US 
data. I also include Mexico and Germany in the comparisons to see how the selection pattern 
differs for the largest immigrant group (Mexico) and the largest European immigrant group in 
the US.  
 To study the country-level determinants of Asian immigrants’ skill selection, I use OLS 
regressions to investigate the association between the educational and occupational outcomes 
and country-level factors, including size of migrant networks in the US, sending country GDP 
per capita, GINI index, and average years of schooling of the home country population. I present 
the models with and without sending countries’ average years of schooling for the concern of 
multicollinearity between education and GDP per capita. All regression models also control for 
time period fixed effects, the respondent’s age, gender, and country of origin. I also include a 
model that also adjusts for US-born non-Hispanic whites’ education trends in the respondent’s 
state of residency and state fixed effects.  
 In the last part of the analysis, I adopt the regression discontinuity design within the 
descriptive framework of this study to draw inference on how H1-B policy changes affect the 
selection patterns of working age (25-64) Asian immigrants in the US. The sample is restricted to 
 






working-age newly arrived immigrants from 12 major Asian countries. I use the year of 
observation as the running variable to test the impact of the 1990 Immigration Act and the 
expansions of H1-B in 1999 and 2001, as well as the H1-B cutback in 2004. I use years of 
schooling as the primary outcome to study the association between the policy and the educational 
selection among working-age new Asian immigrants. I also use the proportion of college-
educated STEM professionals as another outcome since the industry is most likely affected by 
changes in the H1-B program (Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2020). All regression 
models also control for size of migrant network in the US, sending country GDP per capita, GINI 
index, average years of schooling of the home country population, and respondent’s age, gender, 
country of origin, non-Hispanic whites’ average schooling in the state of residency, and state 
fixed effects. 
2.4 Results 
Overall trends in Asian immigrants’ skill selection into the US 
 Figure 1 shows the trends in years of schooling, the proportion of college-educated, and 
the proportion of high school or less educated among working-age (25-64) Asian immigrants 
who newly arrived in the US (in the US for one year or less at the time of observation) during 
1980-2019. Overall, younger Asian immigrants were more educated than US natives and other 
immigrants throughout the years. Older cohorts were less educated than US natives, more 
educated than other immigrants in most of the years. All three groups had rising trends in 
educational attainment in earlier years, and the increase slowed down after around 2005.  
In 1980, the youngest cohort of newly arrived Asian immigrants (25-34) were slightly 
better educated than US natives and immigrants from other regions. The older cohort (45-54) had 






immigrants. Among the oldest working-age cohort (55-64), the US natives had more than one 
year of schooling than Asians and over two years more schooling than non-Asian immigrants. 
Newly arrived Asian immigrants had a higher proportion of college graduates compared to US 
natives and non-Asian migrants. In contrast, the latter two groups had a similar share of college-
educated working-age adults. Newly arrived Asian immigrants also had a lower proportion of 
high school or less educated working-age adults than the other two groups in 1980. At that time, 
newly arrived non-Asian migrants had the highest share of high school or less educated working-
age adults.  
 From 1990 to 2000, newly arrived working-age Asian immigrants’ average schooling 
increases from about 13 years to 14.5 years. The most educated, youngest cohort had an increase 
from about 14 years to over 15 years. The oldest cohort had the most dramatic increase from 
about nine years to 12 years of schooling. The proportion of college-educated new working-age 
Asian immigrants experienced a large increase from about 20 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 
2000. The proportion of high school or less educated new working-age Asian immigrants 
decreased from 40 percent in 1980 to about 25 percent in 2000.  
 After 2000, the increase of Asian immigrants’ education had slowed, and the trends 
plateaued after 2005. The enactment of the 1990 Immigration Act likely contributed to the rise of 
positive selection among Asian immigrants from 1990 to the early 2000s. The law first allowed 
65,000 highly skilled workers to be admitted via the H1-B program every year since 1990 and 
increased the annual number of H1-B visas to 115,000 in 1998 (Kumar, 2020). In 2001, 
Congress enacted the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act (AC21) and 
further increased the H1-B cap to 195,000 annually. The association between the increase of 






program can be further corroborated by the occupational selection trends among newly arrived 
working-age Asian immigrants.  
Figure 2 shows the trends in the proportion of college-educated professionals for newly 
arrived working-age Asian immigrants, non-Asian immigrants, and US-born persons. Younger 
cohorts of new Asian immigrants had a higher share of college-educated professional workers 
throughout the study period. The gap started small in 1980 and widened significantly in later 
years. Newly arrived non-Asian immigrants and US-born had a similar share of college-educated 
professionals over the years.  
Similar to the educational trends, Figure 2 shows a sharp increase in the share of highly-
skilled, college-educated professional workers among younger new arrivals from Asia from 1990 
to 2000, primarily driven by the increase of those in STEM areas. However, the proportion 
dropped considerably from 2000 to 2005. This decline in highly educated professional workers, 
especially those in STEM, coincided with the cutback of the H1-B program in 2004, after which 
the program was reverted from 195,000 visas per year to only 65,000 for regular applicants plus 
20,000 for advanced degree holders (Kumar, 2020). The cap of 85,000 visas continued to this 
day.  
Figure 2 also shows that the proportion of highly skilled professionals among older 
cohorts for all groups had a much slower increase over the years, especially in STEM. The 
phenomenon might be due to agism and a more competitive labor market for older workers 
(Powell, 2010). The slower growth could also be due to H1B visas’ six-year limit, resulting in 
older STEM workers who cannot get Green Card to leave the US after working for six years.  






 Figure 3 shows the trends in educational attainment among working-age newly arrived 
South Asian immigrants, Southeast Asian immigrants, East Asian immigrants, and US natives. 
Overall, South Asians (mostly Indian immigrants) and East Asians (mostly Chinese immigrants) 
were more educated than Southeast Asians and US natives. Younger cohorts of newly arrived 
South Asian immigrants, mostly from India, had the highest share of college graduates 
throughout the study period. Younger new South Asian immigrants also had the lowest share of 
high school or less educated in earlier years. In Figure 4, the regional occupational trends show 
that newly arrived South Asians and East Asians had higher shares of college-educated 
professional workers compared to new Southeast Asian immigrants and US natives. Newly 
arrived young South Asian immigrants had a much higher percentage of college-educated STEM 
workers, followed by East Asians. Newly arrived East Asians had a higher share of college-
educated non-STEM professionals among the younger cohorts after 1990.  
The decline of the share of STEM professionals among newly arrived Asian immigrants, 
especially those from South Asia, in the early 2000s could be due to both the cut back of H1-B 
visas and the dot-com bubble burst that resulted in large scale displacement of IT professionals 
in 2003 (Panko, 2008). But the overall increasing trends in highly positive selection of South 
Asian immigrants and their concentration in STEM fields could be the results of the burgeoning 
technology sector. According to the census data, before 1990, the number of immigrants from 
South Asia was relatively small compared to East Asia and Southeast Asia (Ruggles et al., 2021). 
With the development of the Silicon Valley and Seattle high-tech regions, migrants from India 
nearly doubled by 2000. According to the census’ 2019 estimation, Indian-born Americans have 
become the largest group of the Asian population in the US with approximately 2.7 million 






Chinese immigrants3, and 2 million from the Philippines (Ruggles et al., 2021). Indian workers 
are also the largest group of recipients of the H1-B visas in the tech industry in recent years 
(Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2020).  
A New York Times article published in 1982 pointed out a 125 percent increase of Asian 
immigrants from 1970 to 1980. The article described the earlier Asian immigrants as educated 
professionals but also expressed concern for the increased influx of Asian refugees who were 
“often unskilled and uneducated, illiterate even in their own language.” (Lindsey, 1982). It is 
worth noting that according to the census data, in 1980, among all working-age adults, the years 
of schooling among Southeast immigrants was only slightly behind that of US natives. Figure 3 
also shows that newly arrived working-age Southeast Asian immigrants were only moderately 
less educated than US natives in earlier years. The younger Southeast Asian groups reached a 
similar educational level compared to US natives after 2000. Newly arrived Southeast Asians 
younger than 45 also had a higher share of college graduates than US natives. Older cohorts of 
new Southeast Asian immigrants had an equivalent proportion with college education compared 
to the US natives.  
However, younger new Southeast Asian immigrants did not have a higher share of 
professional workers than the US-born, and older cohorts of newly arrived Southeast Asian 
immigrants had less share of professional workers than other immigrant groups and US-born 
persons. The discrepancy between proportion with a college degree and highly-skilled 
professionals among newly arrived South Asian immigrants might be due to the obstacles for 
educated refugees to find professional employment in the US. Studies have shown that even for 
educated refugees, legal challenges, culture shocks, language barriers, lack of social support, and 
 






lack of services can hinder their chances of getting high-level employment. (Baran, Valcea, 
Porter, & Gallagher, 2018; Jamil, Fakhoury, Yamin, Arnetz, & Arnetz, 2016).  
Educational selection among Asian immigrants from major sending countries 
 Figure 5 compares the educational outcomes of newly arrived Asian immigrants in the 
US and non-migrants in their home countries. The non-migrant data are for all populations aged 
25 and older. To make it comparable, I include all newly arrived Asian immigrants aged 25 and 
older in the US data in the comparison. Overall, for all 25 plus new Asian immigrants in the data, 
the selection has always been quite positive. Newly arrived Asian immigrants’ years of schooling 
had increased from about 12 years in 1980 to 15 years in 2019. In contrast, the average years of 
schooling of all Asian home countries, weighted by their share of immigrants in the US data, 
increased from about five years in 1980 to eight years in 2019. The proportion of college 
graduates among new Asian immigrants 25 and older increased from only 20 percent in 1980 to 
almost 70 percent in 2019, while the average share of college graduates in all Asian home 
countries had maintained a 10 percent level with a negligible increase.  
 Figure 5 also shows the comparison for 12 major Asian sending countries. Although the 
education in these home countries varies significantly in level and growth rate, immigrants from 
these countries were all very positively selected. Most of the developing economies in Asia, such 
as China and India, had relatively low average years of schooling, but the education level among 
their emigrants was comparable to those from developed Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, 
and Singapore. Although many developing Asian countries had negligible growth in their share 
of college graduates among adults aged 25 and older, all 12 Asian countries had an increasing 
share of college graduates and decreasing share of high or less educated among 25 or older new 






Determinants of Asian immigrants’ skill selection into the US. 
 The regression analysis only includes newly arrived (within the last year) Asian 
immigrants aged 25 and above from the above-mentioned 12 major Asian sending countries. 
Table 1 shows the individual and country-level statistics of the analytical sample. Table 2 and 3 
show the OLS regression results for the educational and occupational outcomes. The first model 
(labeled as column 1) for each outcome control for the logged size of migrant network in the US 
and GDP per capita and GINI index of the sending countries. Model 2 (column labeled as 2) 
controls for sending countries’ average years of schooling and present the results in the second 
column. The final model (columns 3) also controls for the US-born non-Hispanic white 
population’s years of schooling in the same time period in the respondent’s state of residency 
and state fixed effects. All models control for age, gender, country of origin, and time period 
fixed effects.  
 Table 2 shows that size of migrant network was negatively associated with new Asian 
migrants’ education level. Consistent with previous literature, as migrant networks increase, 
newer flows of immigrants become less positively selected. GDP per capita was positively 
associated with Asian migrants’ education. A one percent increase of home country’s GDP per 
capita was associated with an increase of about 0.4 years in Asian immigrants’ schooling. GINI 
index was positively associated with the share of college-educated Asian immigrants. Contrary 
to Borjas’s findings, a higher level of inequality in Asian home countries was associated with 
positive selection among Asian migrants. This association could be because it is far more 
difficult for less-educated Asians to travel to the US compared to less-educated Latin Americans. 
The significantly higher migration costs could contribute to the positive selection among Asian 






immigrants’ education. The inclusion of this variable also eliminated most of the time effects. 
The remaining positive association between the earlier years and the share of college-educated 
Asian immigrants could result from the H1-B enactment and the AC21 Act that increased the 
H1-B cap substantially. The education level of US-born non-Hispanic whites was found 
positively associated with Asian immigrants’ education. This indicates that Asian immigrants are 
more likely to reside in states with a better-educated population.  
 Table 3 shows the association between the occupational outcomes of newly arrived Asian 
migrants aged 25 and older and country-level characteristics. The size of migrant network were 
positively associated with the share of college-educated STEM professionals among new Asian 
immigrants but negatively associated with the share of non-STEM professionals. These results 
suggest that new STEM professionals were likely from countries with larger growth in 
immigrant populations. It is also possible that all things equal, more extensive migrant networks 
attract more highly skilled professionals in the similar fields of the previously migrated 
diasporas. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2020), 64% of Asians in 
the US migrated through family-sponsored channels4 , and 21% went through employment-based 
channels. Different networks may work in different ways in attracting new immigrants. Family-
sponsored channels have contributed to the growth of a relatively older and less educated 
migrant network. In contrast, employment-based immigration is more likely to facilitate a 
relatively younger and more educated professional network (Boundless, 2019). It is worth noting 
that even for family-sponsored immigration, the immigrants have had a higher share of college 
graduates compared to US natives (Bier, 2018).  
 Economic prosperity in the sending countries was negatively associated with the share of 
STEM professionals but positively associated with the share of non-STEM professionals among 
 






newly arrived Asian immigrants. This might be a result of the structural change of Asian 
countries’ higher education to adapt to the rapidly changing economy by expanding departments 
other than applied sciences (Hayhoe, 1995). In the Soviet Union and China, since the 1980s, 
social sciences had transformed from the statecraft of elites to much broader terms to meet the 
labor demands in business, management, finance, economics, and law. Traditional disciplines 
such as philosophy, history, and literature, had also adapted to the development of the society to 
include new interdisciplinary fields (Hayhoe, 1989, 1995). Others have found that international 
students from Asian countries had also increasingly enrolled in non-STEM majors such as 
business and social sciences in recent years (Opendoors, 2021).  
 GINI index was found positively associated with all occupational selection outcomes. 
Other than the possible explanation mentioned in the previous section, here it is also plausible 
that highly skilled professionals in STEM and other fields in many developing Asian countries, 
where also high-level economic inequality exists, was underpaid compared to those in developed 
countries such as the US (Ahmed, 2020). Although Borjas’s conclusion does not hold here in the 
case of migration from Asia, the rationale still applies because highly-skilled, college-educated 
professional workers are better rewarded in relatively more equal societies, whereas the 
migration costs for less-educated Asians are relatively high compared to Latin Americans.  
Policy effect on Asian immigrants’ skill selection into the US 
 Figure 6 shows the predicted values of new working-age Asian immigrants’ years of 
schooling and the proportion of college-educated STEM professionals before and after two major 
changes of the H1-B program. The 1990 Immigration Act created the H1-B visa programs, and 
the program was expanded in 1999 and 2001. The top two graphs show that the predicted years 






1990 to approximately 14.6 years after 2000. The predicted proportion of college-educated 
STEM professionals among the group jumped from about six percent in 1990 to 15 percent after 
2000.  
 The bottom two graphs show the likely impact of the H1-B cutback in 2004, which 
reverted the H1-B visa cap from 195,000 to 85,000 per year. The predicted years of schooling 
among newly arrived working-age Asian immigrants did not differ significantly before and after 
the 2004 cutoff line. However, the growth rate of education level among the group declined after 
2004. The predicted proportion of college-educated STEM professionals among newly arrived 
working-age Asian immigrants did see a drop from about 17 percent to 13 percent right after 
2004. All models adjust for size of migrant network in the US, sending country GDP per capita, 
GINI index, average years of schooling, and respondent’s age, gender, country of origin, non-
Hispanic whites’ average schooling in the state of residency, and state fixed effects. In sensitivity 
analysis, I substituted the cutoff line to nearby years instead of 2004. I did not observe the 
discontinuity of the predicted share of college-educated STEM professionals among newly 
arrived working-age Asian immigrants.  
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper studied the trends in the educational attainment and professional occupations 
of newly arrived Asian immigrants and compared working-age new Asian immigrants with other 
immigrants and US natives for four decades from 1980 to 2019. Descriptive analysis shows that 
new Asian immigrants were overall more positively selected on education than non-Asian 
immigrants and US natives, and this pattern of positive selection increased over time. Newly 
arrived South Asian and East Asian immigrants had the highest share of highly educated 






educated STEM workers among new Asian immigrants increased tremendously after 1990 for 
these two groups.  
The regression discontinuity analysis strengthened the possible causal relationship that 
the increases in educational attainment and share of highly educated STEM professionals among 
new Asian immigrants, especially those from India and China, are likely the results of the 
enactment and expansion of the H1-B program in the 1990s. Moreover, the decline of the share 
of STEM professionals among new Asian immigrants in the early 2000s is likely due to the H1-
B cutback in 2004. It is worth noting that the analysis here does not rule out other plausible 
causes. It is also possible that the development of technology industries in the US also 
contributed to the overall growth of STEM professionals from Asia. The decline of STEM 
professionals among new Asian immigrants in the early 2000s could also be partially due to the 
dot-com bubble burst (Panko, 2008).  
The regional trends in skill selection among new Asian immigrants show that the 
education level of Southeast Asian immigrants was not so far behind that of US natives. 
However, Southeast Asian immigrants had a considerably lower share of highly skilled 
professional workers compared to other groups. This might be related to the higher percentage of 
refugees among the group, and the obstacles educated refugees might encounter when looking 
for highly skilled employment (Baran et al., 2018; Jamil et al., 2016). This finding calls for more 
research and advocacy to provide higher education opportunities for less-educated immigrants 
and refugees and help them better integrate into the labor market of the host societies.  
By comparing Asian migrants’ education with non-migrants in their home countries, the 
results show that the lower share of less-educated immigrants might be a result of the decline of 






the native populations, Asian countries, at least the ones in the data, have always been more 
educated, on average, than the non-migrant population, contributing to the brain gain of the US 
over the years. Combined with findings of the policy effects, it is very likely that the current 
immigration policy is blocking the entries of more educated immigrants from Asia, especially 
considering that the moderate H1-B cap has not been updated since the severe cutback in 2004 
(Gower, 2011; Kumar, 2020).  
The study investigated country-level predictors, including size of migrant network in the 
US and developmental factors, including the home country’s GDP per capita, GINI index, and 
education level among the home country population. The results show that the economic and 
educational development of Asian countries was associated with more educated emigration. The 
findings call for concerns about brain drain in Asia, but the relationship might also contribute to 
the brain circulation between developing Asian countries and Western developed countries 
(Rosenzweig, 2008; Saxenian, 2005). The regression results suggest that the emigration of highly 
educated professionals was associated with the increasing economic inequality in the sending 
countries such as China and India, where highly skilled and college-educated workers were 
perhaps paid much less than similar workers in the rich world (Ahmed, 2020). Future research 
should further test the theory on economic inequality in Asia and Asian emigration to the US and 
other destinations to see if reducing inequality could prevent brain drain.  
Lastly, the study found that the diaspora effect works differently for highly educated 
STEM professionals from Asia. More extensive migrant networks can reduce the risks related to 
migration for less-educated potential migrants. At the same time, it can offer guidance for highly 
educated workers to develop a career and find better opportunities at the destination. This finding 






network. Other traits of that network, such as education level and professional abilities, might 






Chapter 3: What Explains the Gap in Welfare Use among 
Immigrants  
3.1 Introduction 
 We investigate the gap in welfare use between immigrants and natives over a 24-year 
period, using the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey 
from 1995-2018, spanning periods of economic recessions, including the Great Recession, and 
recoveries, changes in welfare policy regimes, and policies towards immigrants. A novel 
contribution of our research is to adopt the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis to extrapolate 
the sources of differences in welfare use gap between the two groups. We specifically examine 
the role of demographic factors, macroeconomic trends, and policy in “explaining” welfare use 
gap between immigrants and natives.  
 In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) dramatically changed the rules of welfare participation by imposing restrictions on 
welfare use to a maximum of five years, instituting work requirements on participants and 
sanctions for noncompliance. As we describe in detail below, PRWORA imposed additional 
restrictions on immigrant eligibility for welfare programs. Partly as a result of these changes and 
partly on account of other demographic and macroeconomic factors, immigrant and native 
participation in cash and near-cash programs in the United States has seen dramatic swings since 
1996. During 1994-1996, three years prior to reform, low-educated5 immigrant-headed 
households with children were 5 percentage points more likely than similar households headed 
by natives to receive assistance under at least one of the three primary cash and near-cash 
transfer programs, namely, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental 
 






Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Both groups 
experienced sizable reductions in participation in the following five years, with the decline being 
greater among immigrants, such that in the early years of the 2000s they were less likely than 
natives to receive these benefits. Participation inched upward for both groups during 2000-2006, 
followed by a sharp rise during the Great Recession, and a modest fall in the recent recovery 
(Figure 1, top panel). A broader definition of public assistance that includes public health 
insurance coverage shows similar swings but with a clear trend depicting increasing uptake for 
both groups over the years (Figure 1, bottom panel). 
What explains these trends? To what extent is the gap in receipt of means-tested 
programs among immigrant and native low-educated households with children due to differences 
in demographic characteristics of the two groups; to what extent due to the business cycle and its 
diverse impact on the two groups; to what extent due to welfare policy changes specific to 
immigrants, to what extent on account of changes in local immigration enforcement and other 
policies specific to immigrants; and to what extent due to differences in the geographic locations 
of the two groups? While a number of studies have compared trends in immigrant and native use 
of means-tested programs (e.g., Bitler and Hoynes, 2013; Borjas, 2011), there is no research that 
systematically studied the effects of all the above-mentioned factors on welfare use gap between 
immigrant and natives over the past quarter century.  
In this paper, we investigate the association between immigrant-native participation gap 
in welfare programs and a range of policies depicting immigrant eligibility for safety-net 
programs, and other policies aimed at immigrant inclusion (state Dream Act, eligibility for 
driver’s license), and policies aimed at immigrant exclusion (E-verify, local immigration 






analysis, we examine to what extent the gap in welfare use between the two groups is on account 
of differences in demographic characteristics, geographic locations, macro-economic trends, 
welfare policy variations, local immigration policies and to what extent on account of differences 
in “sensitivity” of the two groups to these factors.  
We start the analysis with two summary outcomes of welfare participation in low-
educated households with children. The first outcome is a narrow measure of public assistance 
capturing take-up of at least one of the three main cash and near-cash transfer programs: TANF, 
SNAP, and SSI. The second outcome is a broader measure and captures receipt of cash/near-cash 
programs and public health insurance (Children’s Health Insurance Program [CHIP] and 
Medicaid).6 For brevity, throughout the paper we use the term ‘cash and near-cash transfer’ 
programs to describe the first outcome and ‘safety net’ programs to describe the second. We also 
present results for each of these five programs separately.    
Briefly, our analysis leads to the following findings: one, if immigrants had the same 
characteristics as natives their participation in means-tested programs would have been much 
less overall and much below those of natives. This finding holds true across the two summary 
measures of welfare receipt as well as five specific safety net programs. It also holds true across 
periods of economic recession and recovery. Second, we find evidence that the business cycle 
impacts immigrant and native welfare participation differently. Immigrant participations in 
TANF, SNAP and SCHIP are more sensitive to the business cycle than native participations. 
Three, we find that changes in program eligibility explain only a modest proportion of the 
immigrant-native gap in welfare use. A possible explanation for this finding is that changes in 
 
6 Specifically, the second outcome is whether the household received any of the five programs: TANF, SSI, SNAP, 






eligibility rules have affected specific immigrant populations (e.g., new immigrants) whereas our 
analysis pertains to all immigrants.   
Policies toward Immigrants’ Eligibility for Means-tested Programs  
An important factor associated with differences in welfare use among immigrants and 
natives is the welfare eligibility rules the two groups encounter. In 1996, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) transformed immigrant 
eligibility for safety net programs. Prior to 1996, legal immigrants and naturalized citizens faced 
the same eligibility rules as the US-born. PRAWORA changed legal immigrant eligibility for 
means-tested programs by splitting them into groups based on citizenship and period of arrival. 
New immigrants living in the United States for less than five years (new immigrants hereafter) 
were banned from federally funded means-tested programs. But for immigrants who had lived in 
the country for five or more years (old immigrants hereafter), the federal government allowed 
state governments’ discretion to use federal funds for TANF, Medicaid, and SNAP benefits.7 
Most, but not all, states granted eligibility to old immigrants. A number of states also used their 
own funds to create substitute programs for new immigrants. The welfare eligibility rules for 
naturalized citizens remained the same as those for US-born households. The undocumented and 
temporary residents were never eligible for means-tested programs and the 1996 reform did not 
change their eligibility. 
A number of legislations following PRWORA restored immigrants’ eligibility for some 
of the programs. First, responding to the public outcry at the perceived injustice of denying 
certain benefits to immigrants, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 restored Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) benefits and Medicaid to all legal immigrants who were receiving SSI pre-
 
7 In the case of SSI, federal law made immigrant eligibility contingent on 40 quarters of work, irrespective of their 
duration of stay in the US, but five states used own funds to cover other immigrants (Kaushal, 2011). The Federal 






enactment. The bill also restored eligibility to pre-enactment elderly and disabled immigrants 
(Dodson, 2001; Fix et al., 2009; Bitler & Hoynes, 2013; Haider et al., 2004; Kaushal 2011). 
Second, the Agricultural Research, Extension and Education Reform Act of 1998 granted food 
stamp eligibility to elderly and disabled immigrants who were receiving food stamp pre-
enactment as well as pre-enactment child immigrants. Nearly one-third of immigrants who had 
lost food stamp benefits under PRWORA had their benefits restored via this act (Haider et al., 
2004). Third, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 further restored food stamps 
to disabled immigrants, immigrant children, and adults with five years of legal residence.  
In 1997, the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) followed the same principle as 
PRWORA of granting legal immigrant children public health insurance if they were in the 
country for at least five years. Several states extended SCHIP (State CHIP) to immigrant 
children in the country for less than five years. By 2002, when most states had implemented the 
key provisions of the 1996 welfare law, immigrant eligibility for TANF, SNAP, SSI, and public 
health insurance differed depending on their state-of-residence and duration of stay. Post-2002 
changes have been few with the exception of the 2009 SCHIP reauthorization that lifted the 5-
year bar to cover all legal immigrant children and pregnant women (Fix et al., 2009; Bitler & 
Hoynes, 2013). The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) followed the 
PRWORA guiding principle and restricted Medicaid eligibility to citizens and permanent legal 
residents who have been in the US for more than five years, but a few states issued exemptions 
to cover certain excluded populations (Pedraza, Nichols, & LeBrón, 2017).  
Macro-Factors Affecting Welfare Use: Economic Cycles and Immigration Policies 
Trends in receipt of means-tested programs among immigrants and natives could differ 






are also differently affected by the business cycle. Orrenius & Zavodny (2010) for instance 
found that immigrants suffered a sharper increase in unemployment during the Great Recession 
than natives. They also experienced higher poverty than natives (Bitler & Hoynes, 2013).    
In addition to the business cycle, immigration enforcement intensified in the past two 
decades through programs such as Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, Secure Communities Program, and Priority Enforcement Program could also 
have influenced immigrant receipt of means-tested programs. Prior studies have found that the 
escalated federal immigration enforcement (Watson, 2014) and Secure Communities Program 
(Pedraza & Zhu, 2015) reduced immigrant Medicaid participation. Further, increased risk of 
deportation was associated with lower WIC uptake (Vargas & Pirog, 2016) and Medicaid 
participation (Vargas, 2015). The rollout of the Secure Communities Program also reduced 
SNAP and SSI participation among Hispanic citizens (Alsan & Yang, 2019). There is mixed 
evidence of a chilling effect of restrictive immigration policies on welfare use among US-born 
Latino populations {Allen (2018) found spillover effects; Allen & McNeely ((2017) did not}8.  
Previous Research on Immigrant and Native Safety Net Programs Use  
A number of studies have examined the gap in immigrant versus native use of safety net 
programs. Studies in the pre-1996 welfare reform period had three main findings: one, 
immigrants were more likely than natives to receive safety-net programs (Borjas, 1995; Borjas & 
Hilton, 1996; Borjas & Trejo, 1991). Two, immigrant households had more frequent and longer 
welfare spells than native households (Borjas & Hilton, 1996). Three, the gap in welfare use 
among the two groups largely disappeared after adjusting for their demographic characteristics 
and economic circumstances (Butcher & Hu, 2000).  
 
8 Allen (2018) found that county level Latino population density moderated the effect of Omnibus bills on program 
enrollment with counties with higher densities of Latino population experiencing low enrollment. Allen and 






The 1996 welfare reform and subsequent state and federal changes in immigrant welfare 
eligibility spawned a large body of research.  These studies indicate that the welfare caseload fall, 
subsequent to the reform, was larger for immigrants than natives and many researchers 
concluded that this was on account of a chilling effect of the policy change that created 
confusion about eligibility and fear of welfare use among immigrants (Loftstrom and Bean, 2002; 
Fix et al., 2009; Fix & Passell, 1999; Kaestner &Kaushal, 2005). As expected, the decline was 
higher for recent arrivals who were more acutely affected by welfare reform (Borjas, 2003; Fix 
& Passell, 1999). Further, many studies examined if welfare reforms led to behavioral changes in 
immigrants and natives across various domains (e.g., employment: Loftstrom and Bean, 2002; 
Kaestner & Kaushal, 2005; fertility: Joyce et al., 2001; food insecurity: Borjas, 2004; poverty: 
Borjas, 2011; health insurance: Borjas, 2003; Kaushal and Kaestner, 2005; health: East, 2018). 
More recent research has examined the role of local welfare policies – restrictive as well 
as expansionary - and local immigration enforcement measures on welfare use. Watson (2014) 
and Weber (2015) found that stricter immigration enforcement was associated with a fall in 
Medicaid and SCHIP enrollment among immigrants and their children. On the other hand, 
inclusionary policies such as the US Department of Agriculture outreach initiative and the SNAP 
expansion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act increased SNAP participation 
among immigrant households (Skinner, 2012; Kaushal, Waldfogel, & Wight, 2013).  
A couple of studies have examined trends in welfare use among natives and immigrants.    
The most comprehensive of these studies is by Bitler and Hoynes (2013), who investigated 
welfare use among foreign-born and US-born households with children using the CPS data for 
1995-2010 and found that immigrant-headed households were 20 percentage points more likely 






income households, the welfare use gap turned negative with the likelihood of immigrant 
households using food stamps, TANF, and SSI falling below those of native households.9 
Camarota (2015) used data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in 2012 
and also found that immigrants used welfare more than native households across various 
programs. He estimated that immigrants used welfare programs more than natives regardless of 
their childbearing status, work status, and education levels. However, the gap in welfare use was 
not examined in the multivariate models that can simultaneously control for all these factors.  
We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, our study covers a longer period (24 
years versus one to 15 years in aforementioned studies) including the period of post-Great 
Recession recovery.  Second, we specifically estimate the association between immigrant 
participation in welfare programs and policies depicting immigrant eligibility for safety-net 
programs and the business cycle. Previous research has not systematically and simultaneously 
investigated the influence of demographic characteristics, macroeconomic factors, and welfare 
and immigration related policies on welfare use gap between immigrants and natives. Our study 
offers a more holistic view. Third, ours is the first study to conduct an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition analysis to “explain” the gap in welfare use between immigrants and natives. 
Specifically, we examine to what extent the gap is associated with demographic characteristics, 
differences in immigrant and native settlement patterns, business cycle, welfare policies towards 
immigrants, local immigration enforcement policies and other policies specific to immigrants 
and to what extent it is on account of differences in “sensitivity” of the two groups to these 











The empirical analysis is based on the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the 
Current Population Survey (also known as the March CPS), a nationally representative data of 
US households. These data provide detailed information on participation in a range of means-
tested programs and public health insurance, the key outcomes of interest in our analysis. The 
analytical samples are from 1995 to 2018 measuring welfare receipt during 1994-2017. In order 
to study immigrant and native welfare use among low-income families, following previous 
research, we restrict our analysis to low-educated households (household heads with high-school 
or lower education) because they have a high likelihood of welfare participation (Schoeni and 
Blank, 2000; Blank, 2002; Kaestner and Kaushal, 2005; Ziliak, 2015).   
We study two summary outcomes of welfare use. The first outcome is a narrow measure 
of public assistance capturing take-up of at least one of the three main cash and near-cash 
transfer programs: TANF, SNAP, and SSI. The second outcome is a broader measure and 
captures receipt of cash/near-cash programs and public health insurance (Children’s Health 
Insurance Program [SCHIP] and Medicaid). Further, we do all analyses on participation in each 
of the following five programs: TANF, SNAP, SSI, SCHIP, and Medicaid.10 For the two 
summary outcomes, the samples are low-educated households with children. We use the same 
household level sample for the analyses for TANF, SNAP and SSI. For Medicaid, we use a 
sample of all adults with a high school or lower education, for SCHIP, all children in low-
educated households.  
We study cash/near-cash programs and public health insurance separately for two 
reasons. One, these programs have diverse impacts on the exchequer. Receipt of cash and near-
 
10 In supplementary analysis, we included housing subsidy as one of the measures of welfare, and the results were 






cash benefits impose a direct cost. The overall cost of health insurance on the exchequer would 
differ across populations: those in poorer health would impose a greater burden than those in 
better health. Previous research documents that immigrants generally have better health than 
natives (Antecol & Bedard, 2006; Kennedy et al., 2015; Riosmena, Kuhn, & Jochem, 2017). 
Further, if lack of health insurance causes immigrants to avoid healthcare when needed, thus 
deteriorating their health and resulting in emergency care, which is more expensive, the overall 
impact of health insurance on the exchequer may actually be less cost (Ku & Matani, 2001; 
Mohanty et al., 2005; Sommers, 2013). Moreover, previous research suggests that increase in 
Medicaid lowered SSI participation among disabled adults (Burns and Dague, 2017; Soni, Burns, 
Dague, and Simon, 2017).  Thus, immigrant health insurance may be cost effective. Two, policy 
changes over the past quarter century have been generally, though not always, to restrict 
immigrant access to cash and near cash programs (e.g., the 1996 welfare reform and public 
charge rule). Changes in health insurance policies on the other hand, until very recently, have 
been to reduce restrictions on immigrants’ access to health insurance (e.g., 1997 SCHIP law, 
2013 ACA, and the associated Medicaid expansions.) 
The March CPS is rich in respondents’ demographics and household information that we 
use to construct control variables for the regression analysis. Age is included as a categorical 
variable with five-year intervals. Education is captured through a dummy variable indicating 
whether the household head (or individual) had completed high school. Marital status is a set of 
dummy variables indicating whether the household head (or individual) is currently married, 
divorced, widowed, or never married. Race/ethnicity is captured by a set of dummy variables 
indicating if the household head (or individual) is non-Hispanic white (reference category), non-






country/region of origin: (US-born [reference category]) Mexico, rest of North America, Central 
America, Caribbean countries, South America, Europe, East Asia, South East Asia, other Asia, 
Africa, or Pacific countries), period of arrival (five years or less, 6 to 10 years, 11-15 years, 16- 
20 years, 21- 30 years, or over 30 years [reference category]), cohort of arrival (before 1970, 
1970-80, 1981-90, 1991-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2010, or after 2010 [reference category]) and 
citizenship status (whether all household members [reference category], some household 
members, or none are citizens). We also control for household characteristics including number 
of children in the household (whether the household has one child [reference category], two 
children, or three or more children) and household size (the household has two [reference 
category], three, four, or five or more people). 
We construct immigrant eligibility for cash, near-cash, and public health insurance 
programs by state and year using various data sources. Bitler & Hoynes (2013) has detailed data 
on immigrant eligibility for TANF, SNAP, SSI, and public health insurance for some years 
between 1997 and 2009. We use various additional sources described below to supplement their 
data. Because federal policy did not distinguish between immigrants and natives before the 
Welfare Reform, we treat immigrants in all states before 1997 as eligible. Data on immigrant 
eligibility for state funded TANF are from the Welfare Rules Databook (Heffernan et al., 2018). 
Data on immigrant eligibility for SNAP are from the United States Department of Agriculture’s 
SNAP Policy Database (ERS, 2017) and Food and Nutrition Service annual reports on state 
options (USDA, 2019). Data on immigrant eligibility for SSI are from the National Immigration 
Law Center (NILC, 2002) and the Social Security Administration website (SSA, 2019). Data on 
immigrant eligibility to Medicaid and SCHIP are from the Medicaid.gov (2016), the National 






2019), and the Health Insurance and Health Reform Authority (Norris, 2019). Appendix Tables 1 
and 2 document state-specific immigrant eligibility for TANF, SNAP, SSI, Medicaid, and 
SCHIP.  
Overall, based on immigrants’ state-of-residence and duration of stay, there are three 
variants of immigrant eligibility for Medicaid/SCHIP across states (Medicaid for new 
immigrants; Medicaid for old immigrants; SCHIP for new immigrant children11); two variants of 
immigrant eligibility for TANF (TANF for new immigrants and old immigrants), one variant 
each for SNAP (for new immigrants) and SSI (all immigrants). In our empirical analysis for the 
summary measures, we create a welfare policy score that gives each program equal weightage, 
and this score ranges between 0 and 4, with a higher value indicating a higher level of 
generosity. Appendix Table 3 uses the immigrant eligibility in 2002 as an example to 
demonstrate how we calculate the policy score for each program in each year. Our analyses for 
specific programs are based on policy scores specific to those programs. 
Data on state unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2018). 
Local immigration enforcement policies under section 287(g) and the Secure Communities are 
taken from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) website archives (ICE, 2009; ICE, 
2013; ICE, 2018). These enforcement data are by county and year. Because the CPS does not 
provide data on county of residence for a majority of the sample,12 we create enforcement policy 
data by state and year using population weights. The population data are from the US Census 
Bureau’s annual resident population estimates (Census 2018). Information on state policies 
specific to undocumented immigrants such as state dream act, eligibility for driver’s license, and 
E-Verify requirements are from Kaushal, Wang, & Huang (2018), Wang and Kaushal (2018) and 
 
11 Legal immigrant children, in the country for more than 5 years, are eligible for SCHIP in all states. 






the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) websites (NCSL, 2015; NCSL, 2016). All 
state-level variables are lagged by one year and merged with the CPS data by state and year.13  
A limitation of our study is that we are unable to adjust for underreporting of benefit 
receipt in government-administered surveys, including the CPS. The underreporting rate sharply 
increased during our study period (Klerman, Ringel, & Roth, 2005; Meyer, Mok & Sullivan, 
2015). Underreporting may be due to stigma associated with program receipt or simply due to 
recall bias or confusion of program names (Meyer, Mok & Sullivan, 2015). In the case of 
immigrants, there is an additional fear that program receipt may jeopardize the immigration 
status of family members. Bruckmeier and colleagues (2015) compared the underreporting rates 
of welfare receipt between immigrants and native-born populations in Germany and did not find 
a significant difference in their rates of reporting. Such evidence, to our knowledge, is not 
available in the US context. If immigrants’ underreporting rates differed from those of natives, 
our results would be biased. If the underreporting rates are similar among immigrants and natives 
as in the German context, under-reporting would be a lesser issue in our analysis.   
3.3 Empirical Strategy  
We use logistic regression models to estimate the association between social assistance 
and a welfare policy score (𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1) that captures state generosity towards immigrants in 
terms of their eligibility for various programs. Equation (1) describes the empirical specification.    
(1) 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺 Pr (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
1−Pr (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
= 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝛽3 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝛽𝛽4 +
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛽𝛽5 + 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ∗ 𝛽𝛽6 + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡   
 
13 Because the March-CPS asked for the welfare participation in the previous year, unless specified otherwise the 
year used in the paper always refers to one year prior to the CPS survey year. Therefore, for the state-level variables, 






In equation (1), 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is an indicator of whether respondent i in state j received social 
assistance in year t. We begin with the two summary measures of social assistance. The first 
measure “cash and near-cash assistance” is equal to 1 if a household received TANF, SNAP or 
SSI in year t, otherwise 0. The second measure, receipt of safety net programs (cash/near-cash 
programs and public health insurance), is equal to 1 if a household received TANF, SNAP, SSI, 
Medicaid or SCHIP, otherwise 0. 𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
respondent was born outside of the United States. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 denotes a vector of household and 
individual characteristics namely age, gender, education, marital status, race/ethnicity, household 
size, and number of children in the household. Iijt denotes a vector of immigrant characteristics 
including country of origin14, years since immigration, cohort of immigration, and number of 
citizens in the household. The specific construction of these variables is described in the data 
section. We also control for a set of time-varying state characteristics (𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1 ) namely state 
unemployment rate as an indicator of the business cycle and state/local policies that have 
specifically targeted immigrants, namely: state dream act, driver’s license, E-Verify, and 
measures of local immigration enforcement under Section 287(g) of Immigration and 
Naturalization Act and the Secure Communities Program. All state-level variables are lagged by 
one year. 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 and 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 denote state fixed effects and year fixed effects. Further, we also estimate 
fully interacted models in which the foreign-born variable is interacted with all covariates except 
for immigrant characteristics and year fixed effects. 
Next, we estimate an equation similar to equation (1) to estimate participation in each of 
the five programs separately. In these regressions, the variable 𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡−1is replaced by a policy 
variable(s) specific to the program. For the outcome on TANF participation, policy is a set of 
 






two dichotomous variables: (i) TANF for new immigrants, which is equal to 1 if a state allowed 
TANF for post-enactment new immigrants (arrived after 1996 and in the US for less than five 
years), otherwise 0; (ii) TANF for old immigrants, which is equal to 1 if a state allowed post-
enactment older immigrants (arrived after 1996 and in the US for more than five years), and 
these variables respectively interact with post-enactment new immigrants and older immigrants. 
For the outcome on SNAP participation, the policy variables are: (i) SNAP for new immigrants 
(equal to 1 if a state allowed SNAP for post-enactment new immigrants, otherwise 0); (ii) SNAP 
for old immigrants (equal to 1 if a state offered SNAP for post-enactment old immigrants), and 
these variables are respectively interacted with post-enactment new and old immigrants.  
Similarly, for Medicaid participation, we construct two policy variables: (i) Medicaid for 
new immigrants (equal to 1 if a state allowed Medicaid for post-enactment new immigrants, 
otherwise 0); (ii) Medicaid for old immigrants variable (equal to 1 if a state-provided Medicaid 
for post-enactment old immigrants), and the two Medicaid variables are respectively interacted 
with post-enactment new and old immigrants. All states provide SCHIP to foreign-born legal 
immigrant children who have lived in the US for five years. For the SCHIP regressions, 
therefore, the policy variable is equal to 1 if a state allowed SCHIP for post-enactment new 
immigrant children, and it is interacted with post-enactment new immigrants. In the regression 
for SSI, the policy variable is equal to 1 if states offered SSI benefit to post-enactment 
immigrants, and the variable is interacted with post-enactment immigrants (arrived after 1996). 
Throughout, we estimate robust standard errors clustered on state of residence to adjust for 







Our final objective is to investigate to what extent the gap in welfare use between 
immigrant and native households/individuals is on account of differences in 
household/individual characteristics, state-level welfare restrictions, immigration policies, and 
macroeconomic trends and to what extent on account of differences in “sensitivity” to these 
factors. We follow the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method for this analysis (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca 1973). Specifically, we adopt the “twofold” decomposition mostly used in the 
discrimination literature (Jann, 2008).  
The method slices (“decomposes”) the gap of welfare use between the two groups, 
immigrant and native households, (𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹 − 𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁), into two components: gap due to differences in 
endowments or characteristics (E) and gap on account of responses to these characteristics 
captured by the coefficients (C). Let V be a vector containing all predictors in our model 
(individual and household characteristics, state unemployment rate, state immigrant-related 
policies, state and year fixed effects) and a constant and B be the slope parameters and the 
intercept. The twofold decomposition hypothesizes that there is a vector B* that can determine 
the contribution of the differences in the predictors.  
Equations (2) – (4) describe the “decomposition” mathematically:  




(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 − 𝐵𝐵∗) + 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
′
(𝐵𝐵∗ − 𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁), where 
(3)  𝐸𝐸 = �𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹 − 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁�
′
𝐵𝐵∗, and  
(4)  𝐶𝐶 = 𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹
′
(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 − 𝐵𝐵∗) + 𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁
′
(𝐵𝐵∗ − 𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁) 
Equation (2) shows the part of the welfare use gap that is explained by the differences in 
the predictors (characteristics) of immigrant and native households. E reflects a counterfactual 
comparison of the welfare use gap if immigrant households had the same endowments 






attributable to differences in coefficients or the effect that remained unexplained on account of 
differences in endowments. The decomposition analysis is performed using Stata 15 with the 
“oaxaca” command, which provides linear predictions (Jann, 2008).  
We also use the “pooled” option to pool covariates into groups and generate coefficients 
for each group to explore to what extent the gap of program participation is on account of 
differences in household/individual characteristics, state-level welfare restrictions, other policies 
targeting immigrants, and macroeconomic trends. We conducted the decomposition analysis for 
the two summary outcomes of welfare participation and separately for participation in each of 
the five programs for the entire 24-year period. Further, to examine if the association changed 
over time or differed across periods of recessions or recovery, we also did the analysis slicing the 
24-year period into five periods: pre-welfare reform period (1994-1996); welfare reform 
implementation period (1997-2002); post-reform period (2003-2007); Great Recession (2008-
2012); and post-recession (2013-2017). One concern with the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is 
that the decomposition results depend on the reference category of categorical predictors. We use 
the normalization option to overcome this problem (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999).  
3.4 Results  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the immigrant and native samples: households 
with children headed by individuals with a high-school or less education. The immigrant 
households are less educated (42% of immigrant household heads, versus 76% of native 
household heads, have a high school degree); more likely to be of Hispanic ethnicity (73% 
versus 12%); more likely to be currently married; have larger household sizes and more children. 
Several of these characteristics put immigrants at a higher risk of receiving benefits. Three-






1996 welfare reform restricted welfare eligibility for several groups of non-citizens, many 
households in the immigrant sample are also likely to be ineligible for benefits.  
Trends in Welfare Use Gap between Immigrants and Natives 
 Figure 2 presents trends in program participation in low-educated immigrant and native 
headed households with children over the 24-year period, and Figure 3 presents the same 
adjusted for age, education, gender, marital status, and race. There are four main points to note: 
One, after the 1996 welfare reform TANF participation in immigrant and native households has 
fallen sharply. While both groups experienced a marginal increase in TANF use during the Great 
Recession, overall less than 5% of households in either group received TANF at the peak of the 
recession and the participation fell in the post-recovery period. Two, SSI participation registered 
a modest, yet steady increase among native households and a modest, yet steady decline among 
immigrant households. Three, unlike TANF and SSI participation, SNAP use in both groups has 
been largely anti-cyclical; since 1997, immigrant households have on average a lower probability 
of receiving SNAP than native households. Four, since 1997, health insurance coverage of 
immigrant and native households has generally been rising and immigrant receipt of public 
health insurance (Medicaid for adults and SCHIP for children) is greater than those of natives 
without adjusting for household characteristics. This finding is qualitatively similar to Borjas 
(2011) who studied program participation by children in immigrant and native households 
(Figure 3 in Borjas, 2011). Once the trends are adjusted for demographic characteristics, natives’ 
receipt of public health insurance is greater than those of immigrants, which is similar to Bitler 
and Hoynes (2013).  
Camarota (2015) however used data from the Survey of Income and Program 






regardless of their childbearing status, work status, and education levels. To investigate if our 
finding differs from his on account of the difference in our data (SIPP versus CPS), we computed 
welfare use by groups similar to those reported by Camarota in Appendix Table 4. We find that 
while the CPS sample consistently shows lower welfare participation compared to SIPP,15 the 
welfare use gaps between natives and immigrants are similar using both datasets. The primary 
difference between Camarota’s models and the adjusted trends we present is that our adjusted 
estimate control for age, education, gender, marital status, and race simultaneously, whereas his 
models include these controls one at a time.   
Association between Policies towards Immigrants and Welfare Receipt Gap 
Table 2 presents the association between program participation and state welfare 
generosity towards immigrants, based on the welfare policy score16 (higher score indicating 
greater generosity towards immigrants) and state unemployment rate as specified in equation (1). 
Model (1) restricts the effect of individual and household characteristics and state fixed effects to 
be the same for immigrants and natives; Model (2) drops this restriction.17, 18  
Estimates suggest immigrants’ higher probability of program receipt (for both outcomes) 
as policy score increased (increased program generosity). The results remain consistent across 
specifications. We also find that program participation for cash and near-cash assistance is anti-
cyclical in that it increases with unemployment. The association between cash/near-cash 
transfers and unemployment is statistically different for immigrants and natives, with immigrants 
 
15 Other studies have also documented this difference (Meyer et al., 2015).   
16 For the cash and near-cash participation outcome, we used a policy score that was based on eligibility to cash and 
near-cash programs.  
17 For a sensitivity analysis, we conducted the same models with randomly selected 50% samples. The results 
remained similar to those reported. 
18 We also estimated these models using county unemployment rate and county level policies towards immigrants 
for the observations where county information is given in the CPS and state level variables (unemployment rate and 
state policies) for the rest of the state without county identifiers. These models controlled for county (state fixed 
effects for those that do not have county identifiers). Estimates, presented in Appendix Tables 6 and 7, were similar 






using cash and near-cash assistance more when facing economic downturns. The unemployment 
effect is statistically the same for both groups with safety-net programs as the outcome.  
Table 3 presents the estimated effects for specific programs. For brevity, we only present 
estimates based on the fully interacted models. Estimates based on equation (1) are in Appendix 
Table 5 and are generally similar to those in Table 3. Estimates in column 1 suggest that state 
policies that allowed TANF benefits for new and old immigrants did not increase TANF use 
among the eligible populations in the post-enactment period. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that other restrictions on TANF eligibility (e.g., time-limited benefit, work 
requirements and sanctions) that are common across eligible immigrants and natives have 
rendered TANF to be a much smaller program and thus relegating TANF restrictions specific to 
immigrant families to be a lesser factor in restricting their TANF participation.  
Estimates in column 2 suggest that state SNAP programs for new and old immigrants 
were associated with higher use of SNAP by these groups, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant for new immigrants. Estimates in column 3 suggest that state SSI programs for 
post-enactment immigrants had no statistically significant effect on their SSI use. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that the SSI provisions were restricted to aged, blind, and disabled 
immigrants whereas our analysis is based on all households with children.  
 Column 4 has results for Medicaid participation using a sample of low-educated adults 
aged above 18 and suggests that state Medicaid eligibility for new immigrants and old 
immigrants were associated with higher levels of Medicaid participation by both immigrant 
groups. Estimates in column 5 suggest that state CHIP policy for new immigrants is associated 
with a higher level of SCHIP participation among new immigrant children, yet the effect is 






take-up of TANF, SNAP and SCHIP are statistically different for immigrants and natives in that 
immigrants are more likely to use safety net programs when facing economic downturns.19 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
Tables 4 – 6 have results from the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analyses. In Table 4, 
columns 1 and 2 present estimates on the gap in immigrants’ and natives’ program participation 
in cash and near-cash assistance programs and columns 3 and 4 have estimates on the gap in 
safety net programs. The top panel shows the overall gap in welfare use and how much is 
attributed to the differences in the two groups’ endowments and their responses to endowments 
(coefficients). Estimates suggest that immigrant households’ use of cash and near-cash programs 
is 2.3 percentage points lower than that of native households. If immigrant households had the 
same endowments as natives, their receipt of cash and near-cash benefits would further decrease 
by 5 percentage points on account of differences in responses. On the other hand, immigrants’ 
use of cash and near-cash benefits would increase by 7.3 percentage points, if their response to 
endowments (coefficients) were the same as those of natives and only endowments differed.  
The second panel of Table 4 presents how differences in specific sets of endowments 
(characteristics) contribute to the gap in program participation if immigrants and natives had the 
same responses (coefficients). Overall, differences in educational attainment (% with a high-
school degree) and race (% of non-Hispanic whites) have the largest effects. These estimates 
suggest that if immigrant households had the same proportion of high-school graduates as native 
households, immigrants’ use of cash and near-cash benefits would fall by 4.5 percentage points.  
Likewise, immigrants’ use of cash and near-cash assistance would reduce by 2.3 
percentage points if their racial/ethnic composition were identical to those of natives. Further, 
 
19 We also conducted sensitivity analysis adding “omnibus laws” which are sometimes referred as “show me your 






immigrant use of cash and near-cash benefits would reduce by 3.8 percentage points if they had 
the same proportion of non-Hispanic whites among them as natives. One possible explanation is 
that our race variables capture unobserved socioeconomic disparities that result in minority 
racial/ethnic groups being at a higher risk of receiving cash and near-cash programs. The 
estimate for state fixed effects suggests that immigrants’ participation in cash and near-cash 
assistance would increase by 1.7 percentage points if immigrants had the same geographic 
dispersion across states as natives.    
The third panel of Table 4 presents how differences in response to specific endowments 
(coefficients) contribute to the overall gap in program participation. Our objective is to examine 
to what extent the gap in welfare use among immigrants and natives is on account of differences 
in characteristics and to what extent on account of differences in response to characteristics. 
Therefore, for ease of interpretation, to distinguish policies towards immigrants and natives we 
reversed the coding for welfare policy variables (in Tables 4-5).20 Overall, most of the gap not 
explained by differences in endowment can be attributed to differences in immigrants and 
natives’ responses to social welfare policy, educational attainment, household characteristics, 
race/ethnicity and state-fixed effects (settlement patterns). Because our reversed welfare policy 
score captures the level of restrictiveness of state welfare policy towards immigrants, as expected, 
immigrant response (coefficient) is associated with a lower benefit use.  
Estimates suggest immigrants’ use of cash and near-cash programs would decrease by 2.3 
percentage points if immigrants responded to high-school degrees the same way as natives. This 
could mean that a high-school degree for immigrants does not fetch as good jobs as a high-
school degree for natives. Among the least educated (those without a high-school degree), 
 
20 This simply changed the sign of reported coefficients. We also did the analysis defining policies as in Tables 2 






immigrants’ use of cash and near-cash benefits would increase by 2.1 percentage points if 
immigrants responded to having less than high-school education the same way as natives.  This 
could be because of larger number undocumented among immigrants without a high-school 
degree, who are ineligible for benefits (Passel and Cohn, 2011). Less-educated immigrants may 
also be less aware of welfare programs and how to obtain them.  
Estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that immigrants were 9.6 percentage points more 
likely to use safety net programs than natives. Given that overall immigrants used less cash and 
near-cash benefits than natives, the positive gap in safety net use is primarily driven by 
immigrants’ higher receipt of public health insurance. As found in Figures 2 and 3, this could be 
substantially on account of changes in immigrant eligibility for public health insurance under the 
2009 SCHIP reauthorization and ACA Medicaid expansions. Here, almost the entire the gap is 
on account of differences in endowments, and the net contribution on account of differences in 
response (coefficients) to various factors is negligible.  
In Panel 2, similar to cash and near-cash benefits, differences in educational attainment 
(% with a high-school degree) and race (% of non-Hispanic white) have the largest effects. Here 
too we find that the difference in receipt of safety net programs on account of exposures to 
macroeconomic factors (e.g., unemployment) and immigrant inclusion and exclusion policies is 
modest. The estimate for state fixed effects suggests that immigrants’ participation in safety net 
programs would increase by 2.6 percentage points if immigrants had the same geographic 
dispersion as natives. These results (along with those for cash/near cash programs) reject the 
welfare magnet hypothesis that immigrants make residential choices to maximize welfare use.   
 Estimates in Panel 3 suggest that immigrants’ use of safety net programs would increase 






towards immigrants the same way as natives. Estimates suggest that immigrants’ participation in 
safety net programs would decrease by 2.1 percentage points if they responded to being 
Hispanics the same way as natives. One likely explanation is that foreign-born Hispanics may be 
working in jobs that do not offer health insurance, which would increase their dependence on 
public health insurance.  
We also find some evidence that if immigrants responded to immigrant exclusionary 
policies, namely local immigration enforcement under Section 287(g), the Secure Communities 
program, and E-Verity the same way as natives, immigrants’ receipt of safety net programs 
would increase by 1 percentage point. Because these policies do not directly involve immigrant 
eligibility for these programs, the evidence here suggests that immigration exclusionary policies 
may be causing a “chilling effect” on immigrant use of welfare programs. We are cautious in 
reading too much into this evidence, as most exclusionary policies are specific to cities, whereas 
the smallest geographic unit available for all observations in our data is state, which limits our 
ability to specify the exclusionary policies with precision.21  
Table 5 presents decomposition estimates for specific programs. The overall differences 
of TANF, SSI and SCHIP participation between immigrants and natives are small and 
insignificant. Compared to natives, immigrants are much more likely to receive Medicaid and 
less likely to receive SNAP. The attribution of the differences is mostly consistent with those of 
the summary measures in Table 4: differences in educational attainment and ethnicity are the 
main drivers of the difference in welfare use. Notably, for specific programs, immigrants did not 
respond to eligibility policy for that specific program significantly differently than natives except 
 
21 We also estimated these models using county unemployment rate and county policies towards immigrants for the 
observations where county information is available in the CPS and used state level variables for the rest of the state 
for which we do not have county identifiers (see Appendix Table 6 and 7). In this analysis, the coefficient on 






for TANF. This finding is different from the previous estimate in Table 3 where we found that 
specific policies had significant effects, specifically in case of SNAP and Medicaid participation. 
One explanation could be that in Table 3 the eligibility rules were specified towards certain 
groups of immigrants (e.g., immigrants who have stayed less than or over five years). But in the 
decomposition analyses, we are comparing all foreign-born as a group and natives.   
Table 6 presents decomposition results for cash and near-cash assistance (panel 1) and for 
the broader social safety net outcome (panel 2) separately for five periods. For brevity, we only 
present the overall differences.22 We highlight one main finding here: across periods immigrant 
use of cash/near cash benefits would have been much lower, and certainly lower than natives if 
they had the same endowments as natives. Likewise, across periods, if immigrants had the same 
responses to endowments as natives, immigrant cash/near cash benefits use would have been 
much higher than that of natives. 
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
We study the long-term trend in program participation among low-educated immigrant 
and native households with children, during 1994-2017, covering a 24-year period encompassing 
changes in welfare policy towards immigrants, local immigration measures, substantial economic 
swings including the Great Recession and the post-recession recovery. Two diverse trends 
emerge from our results. One, immigrant participation in cash and near-cash programs (TANF, 
SSI, and SNAP) falls substantially below those of natives after the 1996 welfare reform and 
remains so during economic upswings and downturns, a finding quite similar to previous studies 
by Borjas (2011) and Bitler and Hoynes (2013).  Two, with regard to Medicaid and SCHIP, the 
rates of recipiency registered a steady increase for both immigrants and natives after the 1996 
 






welfare reform, with immigrants showing higher participation rates. This could be due to ACA 
and SCHIP reauthorization that covered a larger proportion of uninsured foreign-born families.   
An innovation of our research is the use of Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis that 
allows us to take a holistic approach to explain the native-immigrant welfare participation gap. 
Our analysis leads to the following findings: first, if immigrants had the same characteristics as 
natives their participation in means-tested programs would have been much less overall and 
much below those of natives. This finding holds true across broader measures of welfare receipt 
capturing cash/near cash programs and health insurance as well as five specific safety net 
programs. It also holds true across specific periods of economic recessions and recovery. Our 
finding is similar to previous research (Butcher and Hu, 2003; Bitler and Hoynes, 2013) and our 
contribution is that we document the same phenomenon across five different welfare programs 
and time periods spanning economic recessions and recoveries. Further, we advance knowledge 
by not only studying how different characteristic led to the immigrant-native welfare use gap but 
also examining how responses to characteristics drive the welfare use gap.  Overall, this finding 
suggests that given the same endowments, immigrants would be more conservative in 
participating in welfare programs compared to natives.   
Second, we find that immigrant participations in TANF, SNAP and SCHIP are more 
sensitive to the business cycle than native participations, providing some evidence that 
immigrant “dependence” on safety net programs is temporary and closely linked to the economy. 
 Third, our analysis suggests that program eligibility explains only a modest proportion of 
the overall immigrant-native gap in welfare use (even though specific policies that allowed 
eligibility to immigrant groups generally succeeded in increasing participation of the targeted 






that changes in eligibility rules have affected specific immigrant populations (e.g., certain new 
immigrant groups in case of TANF and SNAP; immigrants who arrived after 1996 in case of 
SSI) that comprised a small proportion of the overall foreign-born populations.  This finding 
offers an alternate perspective to supplement previous research that has found substantial impacts 
of policy on welfare use. While welfare policy requirements can significantly influence welfare 
use, prior studies did not directly compare the relative influence between welfare policy 
requirements and other household and contextual characteristics. Our result indicates that welfare 
policy rules are not as consequential as household characteristics in “explaining” the difference 







Highlight Conclusions of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation aims to provide a long-term (over time) and comparative view on what 
drives international migration, who emigrates, and what explains migrants’ welfare participation 
behaviors. To highlight a few findings, first, not all conventional theories on immigrant skill 
selection hold outside of Latin America to the US migration context. For instance, extensive 
migrant networks in the destination do not necessarily lead to less selective immigration (higher 
number of less-educated immigrants) from the same origin. Larger Asian diasporas in South 
Africa were associated with more educated migration from Asia. More extensive Asian migrant 
network in the US were associated with increasing share of highly educated STEM workers from 
Asia.  
 Second, inequality and instability in home countries might push out the educated 
population to migrate. Less-educated groups could be restrained by high migration costs to make 
a move. These findings suggest that for developing countries in Africa and Asia, besides 
economic development, economic equality and political stability are equally, if not more, 
important in retaining an educated workforce to prevent brain drain.  
 Third, in the US, the expansion of the employment-based permanent immigration and 
visa system in the 1990s likely contributed to the growth in highly educated professionals, 
especially in the STEM fields. The visa quota cutback in the early 2000s probably led to a 
decline in highly educated new immigrants working in STEM. Combined with the findings that 
Asian migrants have always been highly positively selected, the results suggest that the current 






 Fourth, while newly arrived East Asians’ and South Asians’ educational attainment and 
professional abilities have been higher than the educational attainment of the US population, new 
Southeast Asians slightly lagged in the earlier years. However, the gap of the shares of highly 
educated professional workers between new Southeast immigrants and the other groups was 
wider. This finding might reflect the obstacles hindering educated refugees from finding highly 
skilled employment in the US.  
Fifth, for less-educated immigrant populations in the US, the findings from my 
dissertation suggest that, given similar circumstances, immigrants are less likely to use welfare 
benefits compared to natives.  Most of the disparities in welfare use could be attributed to the 
difference in educational attainment between immigrants and US natives. On the other hand, the 
restrictive policies made immigrant families more vulnerable to economic downturns.  
Relevance of the Dissertation in Social Work Policy and Practice 
This dissertation highlights the importance of reducing economic and educational 
inequality in both home countries and destination countries. Immigrants’ human capital level 
accumulated in home countries largely determines their lives in the destination. The conclusions 
of this research support policies such as DACA and the DREAM Act, which can significantly 
improve immigrants’ educational attainment, thus enhance their socio-economic well-being in 
the long term. The current employment-based immigration system is also likely outdated. 
Expanding the program could benefit the US by attracting more global talents, especially the 
STEM professionals from Asia.  
Although Asian immigrants as a whole are highly educated, they are not a homogenous 
group. Many Asian immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, were relatively less 






The findings of this dissertation call for more research and advocacy to provide higher education 
opportunities for less-educated immigrants and refugees. The social work profession in the US 
has long traditions of supporting immigrants and refugees, dating back to Jane Addams’ 
settlement houses. Social workers have assisted immigrants in shelter, legal counsel, and child 
protection services over the years in the US. In today’s politically divisive climate on 
immigration, social workers can play even more essential roles to improve immigrants’ and their 
children’s well-being. Besides more services and advocacy focusing on improving educational 
attainment and professional abilities, social workers can also champion more inclusive social 
welfare policies, especially public health insurance policies, to better protect immigrant families 









Arif, I. (2020). The determinants of international migration: Unbundling the role of economic, 
political and social institutions. The World Economy, 43(6), 1699-1729.  
Ariu, A., Docquier, F., & Squicciarini, M. P. (2016). Governance quality and net migration flows. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 60, 238-248.  
Barro, R., & Lee, J.-W. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–
2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104(September 2013), 184-198.  
Beine, M., Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2001). Brain drain and economic growth: theory and 
evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 275-289.  
Belot, M. V., & Hatton, T. J. (2012). Immigrant selection in the OECD. The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1105-1128.  
Bitler, M., & Hoynes, H. (2013). The more things change, the more they stay the same: The 
safety net, living arrangements, and poverty in the Great Recession: National Bureau of 
Economic Research Cambridge, MA. 
Blien, U., Jahn, E. J., Stephan, G., Brücker, H., & Defoort, C. (2009). Inequality and the self‐
selection of international migrants: theory and new evidence. International Journal of 
Manpower.  
Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants (0898-2937). Retrieved from  
Butcher, K., & Hu, L. (2000). Use of means-tested transfer programs by immigrants, their 
children, and their children’s children. Finding Jobs: Work and welfare reform, 465-506.  
Chen, A. Y., Huynh, T. T., & Park, Y. J. (2010). Faces of China: new Chinese migrants in South 






Clemens, M. A. (2014). Does development reduce migration? In International handbook on 
migration and economic development: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Cooray, A., & Schneider, F. (2016). Does corruption promote emigration? An empirical 
examination. Journal of Population Economics, 29(1), 293-310.  
Covarrubias, M., Lafortune, J., & Tessada, J. (2015). Who comes and why? determinants of 
immigrants skill level in the early XXth century US. Journal of Demographic Economics, 
81(1), 115-155.  
Crush, J. (2008). The perfect storm: The realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa.  
Dimant, E., Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2013). The effect of corruption on migration, 1985–
2000. Applied Economics Letters, 20(13), 1270-1274.  
Docquier, F., Lohest, O., & Marfouk, A. (2007). Brain drain in developing countries. The World 
Bank Economic Review, 21(2), 193-218.  
Dutta, N., & Roy, S. (2011). Do potential skilled emigrants care about political stability at home? 
Review of Development Economics, 15(3), 442-457.  
Gagnon, J. (2018). Understanding South-South migration. OECD Development Center.  
Hatton, T. J. (2010). The cliometrics of international migration: a survey. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 24(5), 941-969.  
Hendricks, L. (2002). How important is human capital for development? Evidence from 
immigrant earnings. American Economic Review, 92(1), 198-219.  
Huber, P. J. (1967). The behavior of maximum likelihood estimates under nonstandard 
conditions. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley symposium on 






Kaestner, R., & Malamud, O. (2014). Self-selection and international migration: New evidence 
from Mexico. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(1), 78-91.  
Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2019). Worldwide Governance Indicators.  
Kaushal, N., & Lu, Y. (2015). Recent immigration to Canada and the United States: A mixed tale 
of relative selection. International Migration Review, 49(2), 479-522.  
Massey, D. S. (1990). The social and economic origins of immigration. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 510(1), 60-72.  
Massey, D. S., & España, F. G. (1987). The social process of international migration. Science, 
237(4816), 733-738.  
McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migration and 
inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 
1-24.  
Minnesota Population Center. (2020). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: 
Version 7.3 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS. doi:https://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V7.3 
Mistry, R. S., Biesanz, J. C., Chien, N., Howes, C., & Benner, A. D. (2008). Socioeconomic 
status, parental investments, and the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of low-income 
children from immigrant and native households. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 
23(2), 193-212.  
Ruggles, S., Flood, S., Foster, S., Goeken, R., Pacas, J., Schouweiler, M., & Sobek, M. (2020). 







Solt, F. (2020). Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time: The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database. Social Science Quarterly, 101(3), 1183-
1199. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12795 
Strobl, J. (2014). UNIGIS Geospatial Education Resources. ArcGIS.  
The World Bank. (2019). World Development Indicators.  
Todaro, M. P., & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A 
conceptual framework. Population and development review, 101-114.  
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). (2019). United Nations Human Development Report  
United Nations. (2017). International Migration Report 2017. Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population Division, December 2017.  
United Nations. (2019). International Migrant Stock. United Nations 
database(POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2019).  









Ahmed, Y. (2020). Developers in US earn almost 3 times more than Indian coders, developers in 
Pakistan too, earn more. Retrieved from 
https://www.indiatoday.in/technology/news/story/developers-in-us-earn-almost-3-times-
more-than-indian-coders-developers-in-pakistan-too-earn-more-1648667-2020-02-21 
Baran, B. E., Valcea, S., Porter, T. H., & Gallagher, V. C. (2018). Survival, expectations, and 
employment: An inquiry of refugees and immigrants to the United States. Journal of 
Vocational Behavior, 105, 102-115.  
Barro, R., & Lee, J.-W. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–
2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104(September 2013), 184-198.  
Beine, M., Docquier, F., & Rapoport, H. (2001). Brain drain and economic growth: theory and 
evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 64(1), 275-289.  
Belot, M. V., & Hatton, T. J. (2012). Immigrant selection in the OECD. The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1105-1128.  
Bier, D. J. (2018). Family & Diversity Immigrants Are Far Better Educated Than U.S.-Born 
Americans. Retrieved from Washington, DC:  
Bitler, M., & Hoynes, H. (2013). The more things change, the more they stay the same: The 
safety net, living arrangements, and poverty in the Great Recession: National Bureau of 
Economic Research Cambridge, MA. 
Blien, U., Jahn, E. J., Stephan, G., Brücker, H., & Defoort, C. (2009). Inequality and the self‐







Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Borjas, G. J. (1992). Ethnic capital and intergenerational mobility. The Quarterly journal of 
economics, 107(1), 123-150.  
Boundless. (2019). Family-Sponsored Immigrants Better Educated Than Native-Born U.S. 
Citizens. Retrieved from https://www.boundless.com/blog/high-skilled-immigrants-
family-sponsored-immigrants/ 
Budiman, A., & Ruiz, N. G. (2021). Key facts about Asian Americans, a diverse and growing 
population. Retrieved from Washington, DC:  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2020). 2019 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 
Retrieved from Washington, DC:  
Docquier, F., Lohest, O., & Marfouk, A. (2007). Brain drain in developing countries. The World 
Bank Economic Review, 21(2), 193-218.  
Gower, J. L. (2011). As dumb as we wanna be: US H1-B visa policy and the brain blocking of 
Asian technology professionals. Rutgers Race & L. Rev., 12, 243.  
Hanna, M., & Batalova, J. (2021). Immigrants from Asia in the United States. Retrieved from 
Washington, DC:  
Hatton, T. J. (2010). The cliometrics of international migration: a survey. Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 24(5), 941-969.  
Hayhoe, R. (1989). China’s universities and the open door: ME Sharpe. 
Hayhoe, R. (1995). An Asian multiversity? Comparative reflections on the transition to mass 






Hendricks, L. (2002). How important is human capital for development? Evidence from 
immigrant earnings. American Economic Review, 92(1), 198-219.  
Huang, X., Kaushal, N., & Wang, J. S.-H. (2020). What explains the gap in welfare use among 
immigrants and natives? Population Research and Policy Review, 1-42.  
Ibarraran, P., & Lubotsky, D. (2007). Mexican immigration and self-selection: New evidence 
from the 2000 Mexican census. Paper presented at the Mexican immigration to the United 
States. 
Jamil, H. J., Fakhoury, M., Yamin, J. B., Arnetz, J. E., & Arnetz, B. B. (2016). Determinants of 
employment among well-educated refugees before and after the 2007 US economic 
recession. Letters in health & biological sciences, 1(1).  
Kaestner, R., & Malamud, O. (2014). Self-selection and international migration: New evidence 
from Mexico. Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(1), 78-91.  
Kaushal, N., & Lu, Y. (2015). Recent immigration to Canada and the United States: A mixed tale 
of relative selection. International Migration Review, 49(2), 479-522.  
Kumar. (2020). H1B Visa total cap stats from FY 1990 to 2022. Retrieved from 
https://redbus2us.com/h1b-visa-total-cap-history-from-1990-to-current-year/ 
Lee, E. (2015). A part and apart: Asian American and immigration history. Journal of American 
Ethnic History, 34(4), 28-42.  
Lee, J.-W., & Hong, K. (2010). Economic growth in Asia: determinants and prospects. Asian 
Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series(220).  
Lee, S. S.-H. (2015). Immigration. In Keywords for Asian American Studies (pp. 128-133): New 
York University Press. 






Marginson, S., Kaur, S., & Sawir, E. (2011). Global, local, national in the Asia-Pacific. In 
Higher education in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 3-34): Springer. 
Massey, D. S., & España, F. G. (1987). The social process of international migration. Science, 
237(4816), 733-738.  
McKenzie, D., & Rapoport, H. (2007). Network effects and the dynamics of migration and 
inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 
1-24.  
Mistry, R. S., Biesanz, J. C., Chien, N., Howes, C., & Benner, A. D. (2008). Socioeconomic 
status, parental investments, and the cognitive and behavioral outcomes of low-income 
children from immigrant and native households. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 
23(2), 193-212.  
Opendoors. (2021). Fields of Study. International Students.  
Panko, R. R. (2008). IT employment prospects: beyond the dot-com bubble. European Journal 
of Information Systems, 17(3), 182-197.  
Passel, J. S., D’Vera Cohn, G.-B. A., Gonzalez-Barrera, A., & Center, P. H. (2012). Net 
migration from Mexico falls to zero--and perhaps less: Pew Hispanic Center Washington, 
DC. 
Powell, M. (2010). Ageism and abuse in the workplace: A new frontier. Journal of 
Gerontological Social Work, 53(7), 654-658.  
Rosenzweig, M. R. (2008). Higher education and international migration in Asia: Brain 







Ruggles, S., Flood, S., Foster, S., Goeken, R., Pacas, J., Schouweiler, M., & Sobek, M. (2021). 
IPUMS USA: Version 11.0 [dataset]. In IPUMS, 2021. Minneapolis, MN. 
Saxenian, A. (2005). From brain drain to brain circulation: Transnational communities and 
regional upgrading in India and China. Studies in comparative international development, 
40(2), 35-61.  
Solt, F. (2020). Measuring Income Inequality Across Countries and Over Time: The 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database. Social Science Quarterly, 101(3), 1183-
1199. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12795 
Takaki, R. (2012). Strangers from a different shore: A history of Asian Americans (updated and 
revised): eBookIt. com. 
Textor, C. (2020). Number of Chinese students studying abroad 2008-2018. Retrieved from New 
York, NY:  
The World Bank. (2019). World Development Indicators.  
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). (2019). United Nations Human Development Report  
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2017). Number of H‐1B Petition Filings, 
Applications and Approvals, Country, Age, Occupation, Industry, Annual Compensation, 
and Education, FY2007 ‐ FY2017. Retrieved from  
Vashakmadze, E. T. (2020). The outlook for East Asia and Pacific in five charts. Retrieved from 









Allen, C. D. (2018). Who loses public health insurance when states pass restrictive omnibus 
immigration-related laws? The moderating role of county Latino density. Health & 
place, 54, 20-28. 
Allen, C. D., & McNeely, C. A. (2017). Do restrictive omnibus immigration laws reduce 
enrollment in public health insurance by Latino citizen children? A comparative 
interrupted time series study. Social Science & Medicine, 191, 19-29. 
Alsan, M., & Yang, C. (2018). Fear and the safety net: evidence from secure communities (No. 
w24731). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Antecol, H., & Bedard, K. (2006). Unhealthy assimilation: why do immigrants converge to 
American health status levels?. Demography, 43(2), 337-360. 
Bitler, M., & Hoynes, H. W. (2013). Immigrants, welfare reform, and the US safety net. In 
Immigration, Poverty, and Socioeconomic Inequality, D. Card and S. Raphael, eds. New 
York: Russell Sage, 2013. 
Blank, R. M. (2002). Evaluating welfare reform in the United States. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 40(4), 1105-1166. 
Borjas, G. J. (1995). The economic benefits from immigration. Journal of economic 
perspectives, 9(2), 3-22. 
Borjas, G. J. (2003). Welfare reform, labor supply, and health insurance in the immigrant 
population. Journal of Health Economics, 22(6), 933-958. 







Borjas, G. J. (2011). Poverty and program participation among immigrant children. The Future 
of Children, 247-266. 
Borjas, G. J., & Hilton, L. (1996). Immigration and the welfare state: Immigrant participation in 
means-tested entitlement programs. The quarterly journal of economics, 111(2), 575-604. 
Borjas, G. J., & Trejo, S. J. (1991). Immigrant participation in the welfare system. ILR 
Review, 44(2), 195-211. 
Bruckmeier, K., Müller, G., & Riphahn, R. T. (2015). Survey misreporting of welfare receipt—
Respondent, interviewer, and interview characteristics. Economics Letters, 129, 103-107. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of Labor. (2018) Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics. Retrieved from: https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm 
Butcher, K., & Hu, L. (2000). Use of means-tested transfer programs by immigrants, their 
children, and their children’s children. Finding Jobs: Work and welfare reform, 465-506. 
Burns, M., & Dague, L. (2017). The effect of expanding Medicaid eligibility on Supplemental 
Security Income program participation. Journal of Public Economics, 149, 20-34. 
Camarota, S. A. (2015). Welfare Use by Immigrant and Native Households. Center for 
Immigration Studies, September, 10, 349-365. 
Dodson, M. E. (2001). Welfare generosity and location choices among new United States 
immigrants. International Review of Law and Economics, 21(1), 47-67. 
East, C. N. (2018). The effect of food stamps on children’s health: Evidence from immigrants’ 
changing eligibility. Journal of Human Resources, 0916-8197R2. 
Economic Research Service (ERS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2017). SNAP 







Fix, M. E., Capps, R., & Kaushal, N. (2009). Immigrants and welfare: Overview. Immigrants 
and welfare: the impact of welfare reform on America’s newcomers, 1-36. 
Fix, M. E., & Passel, J. S. (1999). Trends in Citizens’ and Noncitizens’ Use of Public Benefits 
Following Welfare Reform, 1994–1997. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
Fortuny, K., & Chaudry, A. (2012). Overview of immigrants’ eligibility for SNAP, TANF, 
Medicaid, and CHIP. ASPE Issue Brief. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation.  
Haider, S. J., Schoeni, R. F., Bao, Y., & Danielson, C. (2004). Immigrants, welfare reform, and 
the economy. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 23(4), 745-764. 
Heffernan, C., Goehring, B., Hecker, I., Giannarelli, L., and Minton, S., (2018). Welfare Rules 
Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2017, OPRE Report 2018- 109, Washington, 
DC: Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, Administration for Children and 
Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
Immigration Custom Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2009). 
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Washington, DC: ICE. 
Immigration Custom Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2013). Fact 
Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality 
Act. Washington, DC: ICE. 
Immigration Custom Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018). 
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act. 






Jann, B. (2008). A Stata implementation of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Stata 
journal, 8(4), 453-479. 
Joyce, T., Bauer, T., Minkoff, H., & Kaestner, R. (2001). Welfare reform and the perinatal health 
and health care use of Latino women in California, New York City, and Texas. American 
Journal of Public Health, 91(11), 1857-1864. 
Kaestner, R., & Kaushal, N. (2005). Immigrant and native responses to welfare reform. Journal 
of Population Economics, 18(1), 69-92. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF). (2019). Medicaid/CHIP Coverage of Lawfully Residing 
Immigrant Children and Pregnant Women. Retrieved from: https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/state-indicator/medicaid-chip-coverage-of-lawfully-residing-immigrant-children-
and-pregnant-women/ 
Kaushal, N. (2011). Earning trajectories of highly educated immigrants: Does place of education 
matter?. ILR Review, 64(2), 323-340. 
Kaushal, N., & Kaestner, R. (2005). Welfare reform and health insurance of immigrants. Health 
services research, 40(3), 697-722. 
Kaushal, N., Waldfogel, J., & Wight, V. R. (2013). Food insecurity and SNAP participation in 
Mexican immigrant families: the impact of the outreach initiative. The BE journal of 
economic analysis & policy, 14(1), 203-240. 
Kaushal, N., Wang, J. S. H., & Huang, X. (2018). State dream acts and education, health and 







Kennedy, S., Kidd, M. P., McDonald, J. T., & Biddle, N. (2015). The healthy immigrant effect: 
patterns and evidence from four countries. Journal of International Migration and 
Integration, 16(2), 317-332. 
Klerman, J. A., Ringel, J. S., & Roth, B. (2005). Under-reporting of Medicaid and welfare in the 
Current Population Survey. 
Ku, L., & Matani, S. (2001). Left out: immigrants’ access to health care and insurance. Health 
Affairs, 20(1), 247-256. 
Meyer, B. D., Mok, W. K., & Sullivan, J. X. (2015). The under-reporting of transfers in 
household surveys: its nature and consequences. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy 
Studies, University of Chicago. 
Mohanty, S. A., Woolhandler, S., Himmelstein, D. U., Pati, S., Carrasquillo, O., & Bor, D. H. 
(2005). Health care expenditures of immigrants in the United States: a nationally 
representative analysis. American journal of public health, 95(8), 1431-1438. 
National Immigration Law Center (NILC). (2002). Guide to Immigrant Eligibility for Federal 
Benefits. 4th ed. Los Angeles, CA. Retrieved from: 
https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/overview-immeligfedprograms/ 
National Conference of State Legislatures. (2015). States offering driver’s licenses to 
immigrants. Retrieved from: http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-
driver-s-licenses-to-immigrants.aspx  
National Conference of State Legislatures. (2016). State E-Verify action. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-e-verify-action.aspx  
National Immigration Law Center (NILC). (2017). Immigrant Eligibility for Health Care 








Norris, L. (2019). Politics and practicality influence state decisions on control, implementation 
of health insurance exchanges. Health Insurance and Health Reform Authority. Retrieved 
from: https://www.healthinsurance.org/state-health-insurance-exchanges/ 
Orrenius, P. M., & Zavodny, M. (2010). Beside the golden door: US immigration reform in a 
new era of globalization. AEI Press. 
Oaxaca, R. L., & Ransom, M. R. (1999). Identification in detailed wage decompositions. Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 154-157. 
Pedraza, F. I., Nichols, V. C., & LeBrón, A. M. (2017). Cautious citizenship: the deterring effect 
of immigration issue salience on health care use and bureaucratic interactions among 
Latino US citizens. Journal of health politics, policy and law, 42(5), 925-960. 
Pedraza, F. I., & Zhu, L. (2015). ‘Immigration enforcement and the ‘chilling effect’ on Latino 
Medicaid enrollment,’’. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy 
Research Program. 
Riosmena, F., Kuhn, R., & Jochem, W. C. (2017). Explaining the immigrant health advantage: 
Self-selection and protection in health-related factors among five major national-origin 
immigrant groups in the United States. Demography, 54(1), 175-200. 
Schoeni, R. F., & Blank, R. M. (2000). What has welfare reform accomplished? Impacts on 
welfare participation, employment, income, poverty, and family structure (No. w7627). 
National bureau of economic research. 
Skinner, C. (2012). State immigration legislation and SNAP take-up among immigrant families 






Social Security Administration (SSA). (2019). Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI 
Eligibility Requirements, 2019 Edition. Retrieved from: https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-
eligibility-ussi.htm 
Sommers, B. D. (2013). Stuck between health and immigration reform—care for undocumented 
immigrants. New England Journal of Medicine. 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). (2018). Gross Domestic Product by State. Retrieved 
from: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state 
US Census Bureau (Census). (2018). County Population Totals and Components of Change. 
Retrieved from: https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-
counties-total.html 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2019). Food and Nutrition Service annual reports on 
state options. Retrieved from: https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/waivers/state-options-report 
Vargas, E. D. (2015). Immigration enforcement and mixed-status households: the effects of risk 
of deportation on Medicaid use. Children and youth services review, 57, 83-89. 
Vargas Bustamante, A., Chen, J., Fang, H., Rizzo, J. A., & Ortega, A. N. (2014). Identifying 
health insurance predictors and the main reported reasons for being uninsured among US 
immigrants by legal authorization status. The International journal of health planning 
and management, 29(1), e83-e96. 
Vargas, E. D., & Pirog, M. A. (2016). Mixed‐Status Families and WIC Uptake: The Effects of 
Risk of Deportation on Program Use. Social science quarterly, 97(3), 555-572. 
Wang, J. S. H., & Kaushal, N. (2018). Health and mental health effects of local immigration 






Watson, T. (2013). Enforcement and immigrant location choice (No. w19626). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Watson, T. (2014). Inside the refrigerator: immigration enforcement and chilling effects in 
Medicaid participation. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(3), 313-38. 
Weber, H. (2015). National and regional proportion of immigrants and perceived threat of 
immigration: A three-level analysis in Western Europe. International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, 56(2), 116-140. 
Ziliak, J. P. (Ed.). (2015). Welfare reform and its long-term consequences for America’s poor. 






Appendix A: Chapter 1 
 
Appendix Table 1. Summary statistics of individual characteristics.   
 AAE Migrants Age>24 in SA  AAE Migrants Age>24 in the US 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
      
Age 37.89 10.38  47.59 13.21 
Age of immigration 32.91 8.75  38.24 12.13 
Female 0.37 0.48  0.55 0.50 
Race      
White 0.06 0.24  0.34 0.47 
Black 0.83 0.38  0.06 0.23 
Asian 0.05 0.22  0.58 0.49 
Other Races 0.06 0.24  0.02 0.14 
      
Notes: Data are from ACS 2007 - 2011 and South Africa 2011 Census. Sample includes migrants who migrated 
at age 25 or older between 1990 and 2011 from African, Asian, or European countries of origin that have over 50 








Appendix Table 2. List of countries in the analytical sample.  
Destination: South Africa  Destination: United States  Destination: United States 
Country of Origin Sample Size Country of Origin Sample Size Country of Origin Sample Size 
        
Angola 184  Afghanistan 611  Laos 1,046 
Bangladesh 828  Albania 1,423  Latvia 220 
Belgium 64  Algeria 348  Lebanon 1,260 
Botswana 238  Armenia 1,221  Liberia 828 
Bulgaria 61  Austria 353  Lithuania 537 
Burundi 150  Azerbaijan 494  Malaysia 805 
Cameroon 252  Bangladesh 2,602  Moldova 660 
China 578  Belarus 1,203  Morocco 1,085 
Congo 1,853  Belgium 393  Myanmar 1,297 
Egypt 74  Bosnia and Herzegovina 2,551  Nepal 894 
Eswatini  750  Bulgaria 1,301  Netherlands 1,041 
Ethiopia 1,099  Cambodia 981  Nigeria 3,686 
France 129  Cameroon 623  Norway 290 
Germany 429  China 29,778  Pakistan 4,196 
Ghana 399  Croatia 485  Philippines 27,902 
India 1,079  Czechia 473  Poland 5,172 
Italy 91  Denmark 399  Portugal 854 
Kenya 310  Egypt 2,084  Romania 2,734 
Lesotho 4,931  Estonia 112  Russian Federation 8,016 
Malawi 3,512  Ethiopia 2,295  Senegal 288 
Mozambique 7,915  Finland 261  Serbia 1,258 
Namibia 413  France 2,127  Sierra Leone 518 
Netherlands 143  Georgia 334  Singapore 434 
Nigeria 1,467  Germany 5,606  South Africa 1,593 
Pakistan 651  Ghana 2,095  Spain 1,087 
Poland 89  Greece 556  Sri Lanka 904 
Portugal 74  Guinea 165  Sudan 634 
Rwanda 62  Hungary 653  Sweden 648 
Senegal 76  Iceland 58  Switzerland 568 
Switzerland 111  India 30,124  Syrian Arab Republic 758 
Tanzania 186  Indonesia 1,313  Tanzania 265 
Uganda 241  Iran 4,477  Thailand 2,064 
United Kingdom 1,163  Iraq 2,112  Turkey 1,515 
Zambia 587  Ireland 1,276  Uganda 293 
Zimbabwe 19,409  Israel 1,513  Ukraine 6,652 
   Italy 2,005  United Kingdom 9,847 
   Japan 5,579  Uzbekistan 1,049 
   Jordan 667  Viet Nam 16,574 
   Kazakhstan 394  Yemen 365 
   Kenya 1,228  Zimbabwe 314 
   Korea 13,061    












Appendix Table 1. Sending country statistics 



















Immigrant populations are restricted to those who moved into the US no longer than one year ago.  






Appendix C: Chapter 3 
Appendix Table 1. State Funded Safety Net Program Eligibility for Post-Enactment Immigrants 
States 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Alabama                      
Alaska                      
Arizona                      
Arkansas                      
California S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS 
Colorado                      
Connecticut TS TS TS TS TS TS S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS 
Delaware                      
District of Columbia                      
Florida S                     
Georgia  T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Hawaii  T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Idaho                      
Illinois S S S S S S S               
Indiana                      
Iowa                      
Kansas                      
Kentucky                      
Louisiana                      
Maine TS TS TS TS TS TS TS T TS TS TS TS TS TS TS S S S S S S 
Maryland T T T T T T TS T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Massachusetts TS TS TS TS TS TS                
Michigan                      
Minnesota S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S   T T T T 
Mississippi                      
Missouri S T T T T T T               
Montana                      
Nebraska S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS T  T    
Nevada                      
New Hampshire          S            
New Jersey S S S S S S S               
New Mexico  T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
New York S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS T T T T T T T T T T T T 
North Carolina                      
North Dakota                      
Ohio S                     
Oklahoma                      
Oregon T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Pennsylvania T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Rhode Island TS TS TS TS TS TS TS T T T T T T T T T      
South Carolina                      
South Dakota                      
Tennessee T T T T T T T T T          T   
Texas S S S S S S S               
Utah T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
Vermont T T T T T T T T T T T   T T T T     
Virginia                      
Washington S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS 
West Virginia                      
Wisconsin S TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS TS T T T T T T 
Wyoming  T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T 
 
Note: “T” denotes states offered TANF benefit for post-enactment immigrants who stayed in the US for less than five years. “S” denotes states 
offered SNAP benefit for post-enactment immigrants who stayed in the US for less than five years. Data on immigrant eligibility to state funded 
TANF from 1997 to 2017 are from the Welfare Rules Databook (Heffernan et al., 2018). Data on immigrant eligibility to SNAP from 1997 to 2017 
are from the United States Department of Agriculture’s SNAP Policy Database (ERS, 2017) and Food and Nutrition Service annual reports on state 
options (USDA, 2019).  
Most of the states offered TANF to post-enactment immigrants who have been in the US over five years with the following exceptions: Indiana, 
Mississippi, and Texas did not offer state funded TANF to these immigrants during the time covered in our study. Arkansas did not offer before 2008 
and in 2013. Idaho did not offer before 2010. Montana only offered the program in 2000, 2001 and after 2008. North Dakota did not offer the 
program from 2004 to 2009. And Rhode Island did not offer the program before 2001.  
Federal SNAP benefits to legal immigrants who have been in the US for five years were restored under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
of 2002. Before 2003, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Washington, and Wisconsin offered state-funded SNAP program to post-enactment immigrants who have lived in the US for more than five years.  
Only five states offered SSI benefit to post-enactment immigrants: California and Georgia offered SSI after 2001. Illinois offered after 2002. And 








Appendix Table 2. State-Funded Public Health Care Eligibility for Post-Enactment Immigrants 
States 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Alabama                      
Alaska                      
Arizona                      
Arkansas                      
California MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Colorado              C C C C MC MC MC MC 
Connecticut MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Delaware M M M M M M M M M M M M MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
District of Columbia C C C C C C C C C MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Florida C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C MC MC 
Georgia                      
Hawaii MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Idaho                      
Illinois MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Indiana      C C               
Iowa              C C C C MC MC MC MC 
Kansas                      
Kentucky                  M M MC MC 
Louisiana                      
Maine MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Maryland MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC M M MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Massachusetts MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Michigan      M                
Minnesota MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Mississippi                      
Missouri                      
Montana           M M M MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Nebraska MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Nevada                      
New Hampshire                      
New Jersey C C C C C MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
New Mexico              C C C C MC MC MC MC 
New York C C C C C MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
North Carolina              C C C C C C C MC 
North Dakota                      
Ohio                  M M M MC 
Oklahoma                      
Oregon              C C C C MC MC MC MC 
Pennsylvania MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Rhode Island MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
South Carolina                      
South Dakota                      
Tennessee                      
Texas C C C C C MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Utah                    MC MC 
Vermont                  M M M MC 
Virginia             C C C C C C C C  
Washington MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
West Virginia                  M M MC MC 
Wisconsin             M MC MC MC MC MC MC MC MC 
Wyoming                      
 
Note: “M” denotes states offered Medicaid benefit to post-enactment immigrants who stayed in the US for less than five years. “C” 
denotes states offered CHIP benefit to post-enactment immigrant children who have been in the US for less than five years. Data of 
immigrant eligibility to Medicaid and SCHIP are from the Medicaid.gov (2016), the National Immigration Law Center (NILC, 2017), 
the report from the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF, 2018), and the Health Insurance and Health Reform Authority (Norris, 2019). 
After 2002, Alabama, Arizona, Washington DC, Indiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming offered Medicaid to post-enactment immigrants have lived in the 
US over five years. Idaho did not offer Medicaid to these immigrants until 2005. All the other states offered Medicaid to these 







Appendix Table 3.  
State Welfare Policy Score based on Program Eligibility for Post-Enactment Immigrants in 2002 
 
  State had the following programs for immigrants during Five-Year Bar  
State had the following programs for 
immigrants after Five-Year Bar 
 Total Welfare 
Policy Score 
  TANF SNAP Medicaid SCHIP TANF SNAP Medicaid SSI  
Idaho         0 
Arkansas       0.33  0.33 
Mississippi       0.33  0.33 
Montana       0.33  0.33 
Indiana    0.33   0.33  0.66 
Alabama     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Alaska     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Arizona     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Colorado     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Iowa     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Kansas     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Kentucky     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Louisiana     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Nevada     0.5  0.33  0.83 
North Carolina     0.5  0.33  0.83 
North Dakota     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Ohio     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Oklahoma     0.5  0.33  0.83 
South Carolina     0.5  0.33  0.83 
South Dakota     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Virginia     0.5  0.33  0.83 
West Virginia     0.5  0.33  0.83 
Delaware   0.33  0.5  0.33  1.16 
District of Columbia    0.33 0.5  0.33  1.16 
Florida    0.33 0.5  0.33  1.16 
Michigan   0.33  0.5  0.33  1.16 
Georgia 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Missouri 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
New Mexico 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Oregon 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Tennessee 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Utah 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Vermont 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Wyoming 0.5    0.5  0.33  1.33 
Texas  0.5 0.33 0.33  0.33 0.33  1.82 
New Hampshire     0.5  0.33 1 1.83 
Maryland 0.5  0.33 0.33 0.5  0.33  1.99 
Pennsylvania 0.5  0.33 0.33 0.5  0.33  1.99 
Wisconsin 0.5 0.5   0.5 0.33 0.33  2.16 
Illinois  0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.32 
Minnesota  0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.32 
New Jersey  0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.32 
Connecticut 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
Massachusetts 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
Nebraska 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
New York 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
Rhode Island 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
Washington 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33  2.82 
Hawaii 0.5  0.33 0.33 0.5  0.33 1 2.99 
California 0.5 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.33 0.33 1 3.82 










Appendix Table 4. Welfare Participation among Households with Children in 2012: Comparison with Camarota 2012 
 
 Households with Children (CPS 2012) Households with Children (Camarota 2012 using SIPP) 


















         
Any Welfare 36.7% 0.57% 51.3% 1.20% 52.4% 1.2% 75.9% 2.1% 
Any Welfare Excl. 
School Lunch 33.2% 0.56% 44.3% 1.19% 45.4% 1.1% 64.7% 2.3% 
Cash 6.3% 0.29% 5.9% 0.56% 12.8% 0.7% 10.9% 1.6% 
SSI 4.5% 0.25% 3.7% 0.45% 7.7% 0.6% 5.9% 1.0% 
TANF 2.1% 0.17% 2.3% 0.36% 4.3% 0.4% 3.6% 0.9% 
Food 24.5% 0.51% 36.7% 1.16% 44.8% 1.2% 68.5% 2.3% 
School Lunch 68.5% 1.02% 66.5% 1.85% 37.8% 1.3% 61.8% 2.2% 
WIC 24.7% 0.61% 29.9% 1.34% 12.6% 0.8% 22.0% 1.9% 
SNAP 15.9% 0.44% 17.7% 0.92% 25.9% 1.0% 28.7% 2.4% 
SNAP or WIC 17.1% 0.45% 19.9% 0.96%     
Medicaid 29.5% 0.54% 41.0% 1.18% 42.1% 1.2% 61.6% 2.4% 
Housing 4.4% 0.25% 4.3% 0.49% 7.7% 0.7% 5.0% 1.2% 
Public 34.0% 0.64% 49.1% 1.34% 6.3% 0.6% 4.2% 1.1% 
Subsidized 29.4% 0.58% 44.5% 1.26% 2.4% 0.4% 1.1% 0.5% 
Sample Size 
        
28,122   
          
6,938   6,239  1,308  
Weighted n (millions) 
             
38.4   
             
10.0   32.01  7.53  
 
Note: The four columns on the left-side panel use data from the March CPS 2012. The sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at 








Appendix Table 5. Association between Specific Safety Net Programs and Welfare Policies and the Business Cycle 
 TANF  SNAP  SSI  Medicaid  CHIP 
          
State TANF policy 1.166* State SNAP policy 0.825*** State SSI policy 1.057 State Medicaid policy 1.024 State CHIP policy 0.980 
for post-enactment (PE) (0.106) for PE new immigrants (0.057) for PE immigrants3 (0.037) for PE new immigrants (0.040) for PE new immigrants4 (0.042) 
new immigrants1          
          
State TANF policy  0.897 State SNAP policy  1.118   State Medicaid policy  1.011   
for PE old immigrants2 (0.114) For PE old immigrants (0.088)   for PE old immigrants (0.037)   
          
PE new immigrants x 0.886 PE new immigrants x 1.235** PE immigrants x 1.104 PE new immigrants x 1.280*** PE new immigrants x 1.388*** 
State TANF policy  (0.121) State SNAP policy  (0.131) State SSI policy  (0.087) State Medicaid policy  (0.077) State CHIP policy  (0.117) 
for PE new immigrants  for PE new immigrants  for PE immigrants  for PE new immigrants  for PE new immigrants  
          
PE old immigrants x 1.007 PE old immigrants x 1.459***   PE old immigrants x 1.556***   
State TANF policy  (0.116) State SNAP policy  (0.180)   State Medicaid policy  (0.086)   
for PE old immigrants  for PE old immigrants    for PE old immigrants    
          
Unemployment rate 1.039 Unemployment rate 1.122*** Unemployment rate 1.003 Unemployment rate 1.012 Unemployment rate 1.032*** 
 (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
          
Foreign-born x 1.050*** Foreign-born x 1.041*** Foreign-born x 1.029* Foreign-born x 1.023*** Foreign-born x 1.078*** 
Unemployment rate (0.016) Unemployment rate (0.010) Unemployment rate (0.016) Unemployment rate (0.006) Unemployment rate (0.024) 
          
N 333422 N 333422 N 333422 N 1415132 N 591812 
 
Note: 1. Post-enactment (PE) new immigrants refer to those who arrived after 1996 and have lived in the US for less than five years. 2. PE old immigrants refer to those who 
arrived after 1996 and have lived for over five years. 3. For SSI, the policy variable is defined as whether the state had SSI for immigrants who arrived after 1996 and is interacted 
with being an immigrant who arrived after 1996. 4. For CHIP, the policy variable is defined as whether the state had CHIP for immigrant children who arrived after 1996 and have 
lived in the US for less than five years and is interacted with being a PE new immigrant. For TANF, SNAP and SSI, the samples are restricted to low-educated households 
(household heads with a high school or less education) and at least one child <18. For Medicaid, the sample is restricted to low-educated adults. For CHIP, the sample is restricted 
to children from low-educated households. All models control for state and year fixed effects, individual characteristics (age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and marital status), 
immigrant characteristics country of origin, cohort of immigration, year since immigration and citizenship status), household characteristics (number of children in the household 
and household size), state immigrant-related policies (state dream act, driver’s license, E-Verify, Section 287(g) of Immigration and Naturalization Act, and the Secure 
Communities Program), and interaction terms between the foreign-born variable and state immigrant-related policy variables. Coefficients in the table are exponentiated 






Appendix Table 6. Robustness Check: Association between State Welfare Policy Score and the 
Business Cycle and Program Participation among Low-Educated Households with Children 
(with County Variables)  
 
 
Cash and Near-Cash 
Assistance 
Social Safety Net 
Programs 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
     
State Welfare Policy Score 0.899*** 0.903*** 1.011 1.019 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) 
     
Foreign-Born x  1.129*** 1.129*** 1.123*** 1.058** 
State Welfare Policy Score (0.043) (0.048) (0.027) (0.025) 
     
County/State unemployment rate 1.074*** 1.074*** 1.034*** 1.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
Foreign-born x 1.034*** 1.030*** 1.017* 1.008 
County/State Unemployment rate (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
     
Foreign-born x Individual 
Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Foreign-born x Household 
Characteristics No Yes No Yes 
Foreign-born x County/State Fixed 
Effects No Yes No Yes 
     
N 333351 333000 333422 333330 
 
Note: Household data are from the March CPS 1995-2018 showing welfare use information from 1994 to 2017. The 
sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at least one child <18. Cash and 
near-cash programs include TANF, SNAP and SSI. Safety net programs include cash and near-cash programs, 
Medicaid and SCHIP. All models control for county (state fixed effects for those do not have county identifier) and 
year fixed effects, individual characteristics (household heads’ age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and marital 
status), immigrant characteristics (household heads’ country of origin, cohort of immigration, year since 
immigration and citizenship status), household characteristics (number of children in the household and household 
size), county unemployment rate county (state unemployment rate for those do not have county identifier), and 
county immigrant-related policies (state dream act, driver’s license, E-Verify, Section 287(g) of Immigration and 
Naturalization Act, and the Secure Communities Program) (state level policies for those do not have county 
identifier), and interaction terms between the foreign-born variable and state immigrant-related policy variables. 
Model 2 are the fully interacted models which include interactions between whether the respondent is foreign-born 
and all explanatory variables except for immigrant characteristics and year fixed effects. Coefficients in the table 
show exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) of logistic regression and robust standard errors clustered by state in 







Appendix Table 7. Robustness Check: Decomposition Results for Program Participation Gap 
between Low-Educated Native and Immigrant Headed Households with Children (with County 
Variables) 
 
 Cash and Near-Cash Assistance Safety Net Programs 
Overall Coef.  SE  Coef.  SE 
Panel 1        
Immigrants 0.206 *** 0.007 
 
0.479 *** 0.010 
Natives 0.229 *** 0.005 
 
0.382 *** 0.007 
Difference -0.023 *** 0.008 
 
0.096 *** 0.010 
Endowments (Explained) 0.051 *** 0.008 
 
0.098 *** 0.009 
Coefficients (Unexplained) -0.074 *** 0.006 
 
-0.002  0.007  
   
 
   
Panel 2: Endowments (Explained)    
 
   
Reversed State Welfare Policy Score -0.003  0.002 
 
0.004 * 0.002 
Education (Whether Completed High School) 0.046 *** 0.003 
 
0.052 *** 0.003 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.018 *** 0.007  0.045 *** 0.007 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.037 *** 0.003 
 
0.044 *** 0.003 
        Non-Hispanic Black -0.007 *** 0.001 
 
-0.006 *** 0.001 
        Hispanic -0.015 *** 0.005 
 
0.005  0.004 
        Other Races/Ethnicities 0.002 *** 0.001 
 
0.001 * 0.001 
Other Individual/Household Characteristics -0.008 *** 0.002 
 
-0.001  0.002 
County/State Unemployment Rate 0.010 *** 0.002 
 
0.006 *** 0.002 
Immigrant Inclusion Policies -0.002  0.001 
 
0.002  0.002 
Immigrant Exclusion Policies -0.001  0.001 
 
-0.002 ** 0.001 
County/State Fixed Effects -0.015 *** 0.006 
 
-0.023 *** 0.007 
Year Fixed Effects 0.004 *** 0.001 
 
0.016 *** 0.003  
   
 
   
Panel 3: Coefficients (Unexplained)    
 
   
Reversed State Welfare Policy Score -0.012  0.008 
 
-0.043 *** 0.010 
∑Education 0.002  0.002  0.001  0.002 
        Did Not Complete High School -0.022 *** 0.001 
 
-0.022 *** 0.002 
        Completed High School 0.024 *** 0.001  0.023 *** 0.002 
∑Ethnicity/Race 0.014 *** 0.004  0.023 *** 0.004 
        Non-Hispanic White 0.010 *** 0.002 
 
0.007 *** 0.002 
        Non-Hispanic Black -0.002  0.001 
 
-0.002  0.001 
        Hispanic 0.008 * 0.004 
 
0.020 *** 0.004 
        Other Races/Ethnicities -0.002 * 0.001 
 
-0.003 ** 0.001 
Other Individual/Household Characteristics 0.007  0.011 
 
-0.077 *** 0.012 
County/State Unemployment Rate -0.012  0.014  0.009  0.023 
Immigrant Inclusion Policies -0.003  0.003 
 
-0.002  0.004 
Immigrant Exclusion Policies -0.003  0.003 
 
-0.009  0.006 
County/State Fixed Effects -0.008  0.005 
 
-0.008  0.007 
Year Fixed Effects 0.000  0.001 
 
0.006 *** 0.002 
Constant -0.058 ** 0.024 
 
0.099 *** 0.025 
        
Group 1: Immigrants. Number of Observations = 79,024  
Group 2: Natives. Number of Observations = 254,413 
 
Note: The sample is restricted to household heads with a high school or less education and at least one child <18. 
Cash and near-cash programs include TANF, SNAP and SSI. Safety net programs include cash and near-cash 
programs, Medicaid and SCHIP. “Other individual/household characteristics” include household heads’ age, gender, 
marital status, number of children in the household and household size. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
